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deterring wrongful behavior. Yet skeptics of shareholder litigation have raised doubts 
about the degree to which such suits track actual malfeasance. The challenge is that 
managerial wrongdoing is almost never observable. While researchers can identify 
claims and—to some degree—evaluate their merits, such studies are limited to 
examining instances of wrongdoing that are actually litigated. We develop a novel 
approach to overcome this limitation in the context of one of the most notable 
corporate scandals of the twenty-first century: stock options backdating. Options 
backdating involves falsifying incentive option grant dates in order to increase the 
value of the options to executives. The manipulation of grant dates leaves a 
measurable statistical fingerprint, which we used to estimate the likelihood of 
backdating among not only companies sued for the practice, but across a sample of 
thousands of firms that used option compensation. We compare the likelihood that 
firms backdated with the incidence and disposition of shareholder derivative and 
securities class action lawsuits. We find that many firms that likely engaged in 
backdating were never sued and that even firms publicly named as backdaters in the 
press were not universally sued. Instead, plaintiffs’ attorneys were selective in 
targeting firms with more egregious patterns of backdating. We also examine the 
motion to dismiss, settlements, and the use of special litigation committees, and we 
find that the probability of backdating is important for the latter two. These results 
are an important contribution to the shareholder litigation literature and are 
particularly timely and important for the unfolding debate over fee-shifting bylaws. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Corporate managers are deterred from wrongdoing by both public and 
private enforcement. While some types of corporate malfeasance may result 
in criminal or civil sanctions at the hands of the government, the staff and 
budget of regulators are limited. For this reason, corporate law relies heavily 
on private enforcement through state law derivate suits and federal securities 
class actions.1 The efficiency and effectiveness of private enforcement are 
therefore of central concern for corporate law. 
A threshold question is whether the merits of legal claims matter in 
stockholder litigation. Private enforcement relies heavily on the plaintiffs’ bar 
to identify and prosecute promising cases. Since suits are initiated by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and settled by corporate managers using firm or insurance 
company dollars, the risk of strike suits and collusive settlements is high.2 
The problem confronting efforts to answer this question is that the merits of 
claims of corporate malfeasance are generally unobservable. To get around 
this problem, prior research on stockholder litigation has relied on variables 
that can be observed and are assumed to correlate with legal merit: the 
presence of an accounting restatement, for example, or a parallel SEC 
investigation. Such measures are noisy proxies for the merits of cases. 
Moreover, such a strategy restricts the researcher to legal claims actually 
litigated and omits cases of malfeasance that never resulted in a claim being 
filed. This is a significant omission, as the deterrence function of litigation 
depends critically on the probability that bad acts reliably lead to litigation.  
 This Article takes a novel approach to studying stockholder litigation by 
identifying a context in which it is possible to quantify breaches of duty across 
a large universe of firms, both sued and unsued. Specifically, we study cases 
arising out of the stock options backdating scandal. Backdating involved the 
falsification of the grant dates for stock options used to compensate key 
employees in order to covertly increase the employees’ compensation.3 
 
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINER H. KRAAKMAN, & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, 
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 363-64 (3d ed. 
2009) [hereinafter AKS] (noting that derivative suits and class actions allow plaintiffs to “bring 
claims of fiduciary breach on behalf of disaggregated shareholders”).  
2 Id. at 371-73 (discussing how factors such as plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking settlements in 
nonmeritorious claims, corporations or their insurers bearing the cost of settling, and the structure 
of attorneys’ fees can create greater incentives for strike suits and settlements).  
3 See, e.g., David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the 
Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 567-75 (2007) (detailing the background and context 
contributing to the development of the backdating phenomenon).  
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Executive stock options typically set an exercise price4 equal to the stock price 
on the day the option was issued, and as a result, options issued on days when 
the stock price happened to be low were more valuable to executives.5 By 
falsifying grant dates, backdaters were able to create an appearance that grants 
were issued on dates in the past when the stock price happened to be low, 
while accounting for them as though they had been issued on the falsified 
date. Backdating involved the manipulation of stock option grants with 
statistically measurable consequences: grants were more likely to be issued on 
favorable dates. Because of this practice, and because option grants are 
publicly reported, we are able to calculate the likelihood that individual firms 
engaged in manipulative practices over a very large sample. This 
methodology provides a measure of the merits6 of potential backdating claims 
that is both more precise and available for a larger universe of firms than in 
other types of litigation.  
The data for this study includes hand-collected data on private 
shareholder litigation—both derivative suits under state law and class actions 
under the federal securities laws—alleging options backdating. For derivative 
suits, we have collected extensive information on each case, including the full 
set of claims pre-consolidation, the decision on the motion to dismiss, the use 
and recommendations of special litigation committees, and information about 
attorneys’ fees and settlement. We supplement this data with information 
about the presence of securities class actions from public reports, public lists 
of SEC investigations, and the disclosure of backdating activities in media 
and analyst reports.  
We combine this legal data with data on option grants and statistical 
simulation to estimate both the probability that a firm engaged in backdating 
and the extent to which the executive recipients of option grants benefited 
from that backdating. These measurements provide a more precise picture of 
the merits than in other shareholder litigation contexts. It is possible, 
therefore, to produce a firm-level, ex ante estimation of the merits of 
backdating claims for a large sample of firms. Armed with these estimates of 
merit, we investigate whether shareholder litigation, in the aggregate, targets 
 
4 The exercise price is the amount that a holder of the option would be required to pay in order 
to purchase a share of stock at some point in the future—that is, to exercise the option.  
5 Walker, supra note 3, at 570.  
6 Our methodology captures the merits of claims insofar as we are able to statistically     identify 
backdating. We acknowledge, of course, that there are other components of a successful backdating 
claim, some of which may be procedural in nature, that are not directly related to the alleged 
wrongful activity and not captured by this measure. Whether the firm, in fact, engaged in backdating 
is nevertheless the core merits question.  
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the “right” firms, how the merits affect the progress and disposition of the 
litigation, and whether the recoveries correlate to the merits of the claim.  
We find that a majority of firms that likely engaged in backdating were 
never publicly linked to the practice. Among those firms publicly alleged to 
have engaged in backdating—in analyst reports or news coverage—a majority, 
but not all, were named in a derivative suit. Even fewer firms were targets of 
securities class actions. The sued firms were more likely to have backdated and 
have higher total reversal around likely-backdated option grants than the 
publicly implicated but unsued firms. Similarly, firms targeted in class actions, 
which were a subset of the firms sued derivatively, show more egregious 
patterns of backdating than firms subject only to derivative claims and also 
larger stock price drops when backdating activity was revealed. These results 
suggest that the incidence of lawsuits—even controlling for public revelations 
of backdating and SEC investigations—was linked to merits-related measures 
of backdating activity.  
We also find that sued firms differ from unsued firms along other 
dimensions. Derivatively sued firms were larger than implicated but unsued 
firms. Additionally, firms that were targets of SEC investigations were more 
likely to face both class action and derivative suits. We observe a race-to-the-
courthouse effect in derivative litigation, with multiple lawsuits targeting a 
single firm and making similar allegations. This effect was strongest among 
large firms and firms investigated by the SEC, though the number of 
complaints was not otherwise related to our measures of merit.  
We find no strong predictors of the disposition of the motion to dismiss 
in either derivative or class action suits. None of the covariates is significant 
in our regressions for either derivative or class action claims, and even a 
sensitive non-parametric test does not distinguish the merits of dismissed 
claims from non-dismissed claims. This may reflect that the motion to 
dismiss often turns on legal rules that are not directly related to the alleged 
wrongful activity, such as demand on the board in the derivative context.7  
We find some evidence that the size of settlements is related to the merits 
of cases. For shareholder derivative suits, we use the size of attorneys’ fees as a 
proxy for the settlement amount, and we find that fees are related to the level 
of backdating activity. For class action suits, we find no relationship between 
settlement amounts and either the backdating probability or the total value 
 
7 Plaintiffs in derivative suits must establish that it would be futile to demand the corporation’s 
board to cause the corporation to sue in its own right. See AKS, supra note 1, at 383-85 (discussing 
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993), and “the right of a stockholder to prosecute a derivative 
suit [to be] limited to situations where the stockholder has demanded that the directors pursue the 
corporate claim and they have wrongfully refused to do so”).  
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extracted through backdating. However, we do find that when the SEC 
conducted an investigation, cases had larger settlements.  
 We also examine the use of special litigation committees (SLCs) as a tool 
to regain corporate control over derivative litigation. We find that the use of 
SLCs was both strongly related to the number of complaints filed and an 
indicator variable reflecting a very high probability of actual backdating 
activity. Interestingly, only a minority of SLCs recommended that the 
company seek dismissal of the claims, contrary to the common claim that 
SLCs recommend dismissal as a matter of course.  
The welfare implications of stockholder litigation in general and the 
derivative suit in particular are hotly disputed in corporate law scholarship. 
Some scholars have concluded that the derivative suit is in need of radical 
reform,8 if not complete abolition.9 In important ways, state corporate law 
has responded to these critiques by forcing derivative plaintiffs to run a 
demanding gauntlet of procedural requirements.10 Others have a more 
positive view of derivative litigation, seeing it as an important bulwark 
against managerial opportunism.11 The debate over derivative litigation has 
gained particular importance in the aftermath of the recent ATP Tour, Inc. v. 
Deutscher Tennis Bund case. In ATP Tour, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that corporate bylaws that shift the cost of derivative litigation to 
 
8 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 404 (2002) 
(suggesting that states “allow firms to opt out of the derivative suit process by charter amendment”); 
see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-16 
(1991) (proposing that courts auction off derivative and class action claims).  
9 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 404 (making a case for “eliminating derivative litigation”); see 
also TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY 
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 20 (2010) (“[I]f shareholder litigation does 
not deter, then it loses its core justification and ought, therefore, to be abolished.”). 
10 See Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (holding courts should be “reluctant 
to permit shareholder derivative suits”); see also BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 29 (“[T]he 
procedural obstacles associated with demand have substantially limited [the derivative suit’s] 
usefulness . . . . State law has decided . . . that the derivative suit remedy to corporate 
mismanagement was often worse than the disease . . . .”). 
11 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1750 (2004) (“Overall, the claim that derivative suits are typically 
strike suits is much weaker than in earlier periods.”). In an earlier era, the Supreme Court noted 
that the derivative suit, “born of stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate 
management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of 
stockholders’ interests.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Without 
the ability to bring a derivative claim, “there would be little practical check on such abuses.” Id.; see 
also Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible? 
(describing the derivative suit as “the most important procedure the law has yet developed to police 
the internal affairs of corporations”), in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 
(Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). 
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unsuccessful plaintiffs are lawful.12 Such bylaws would increase the expected 
costs of pursuing a stockholder claim and thus may reduce—perhaps 
dramatically—the volume of stockholder litigation. This, of course, is the 
ambition of those who promote such bylaws, but there is a concomitant risk 
that such a wholesale approach would eliminate meritorious suits as surely as 
it would eliminate nuisance suits. If derivative litigation is unrelated to the 
underlying merit of claims, then there would be little worth preserving. The 
fee shifting debate in Delaware was at least temporarily resolved when, over 
the objection of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Delaware passed an 
amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) in 2015 that 
effectively prohibited corporations from adopting bylaws that would shift the 
cost of litigation to losing plaintiffs.13  
The data we present here suggests that derivative litigation—at least in the 
backdating context—is more responsive to the underlying merits than many 
observers suspect. Sued companies have higher measures of both the magnitude 
and probability of backdating than unsued firms, and we find a significant 
relationship between attorneys’ fees and merit. The relationship between 
measures of legal merit and litigation outcomes suggests that efforts to reform 
the pathologies of stockholder litigation should be approached with caution.  
At the same time, one of the unique features of our data here—the 
availability of measures of legal merit and potential damages—counsels 
against generalizing our findings. The measures of merit and damages we 
compute are based on publicly available information, so plaintiffs’ attorneys 
could have relied on them just as we have here. Accordingly, the 
responsiveness of derivative litigation in this context may not necessarily 
mean that derivative litigation works well in contexts where the merits are 
obscured from the view of researchers and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Nevertheless, 
in light of the fact that the continued existence of shareholder derivative 
liability is a matter of open debate, identifying a context in which derivative 
suits are merits-related is important.  
The information we present about backdating litigation is also 
important in its own right. While existing studies have analyzed the 
prevalence of backdating, the price impact of being implicated in the 
backdating scandal, and SEC investigations of backdating, ours is the first 
 
12 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). Technically, the 
decision concerned only a nonstock company, but there was no indication that the court intended 
the holding to be so limited.  
13 See, e.g., Tom Hals, Delaware Bans 'Loser-Pays' Rules in Corporate Class Actions, REUTERS (June 25, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/25/delaware-corporatelaw-idUSL1N0ZB1JN20150625 [http://
perma.cc/3NLM-GQ86] (discussing the reasoning behind the adoption of the law, including the concern that 
fee-shifting would wipe out shareholder litigation and the ability to police corporate boards).  
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study to offer a comprehensive picture of private shareholder litigation 
involving backdating allegations. 
I. DERIVATIVE LITIGATION AND OPTIONS BACKDATING 
Do the merits of corporate legal claims affect the incidence and outcomes 
of stockholder suits? The question cuts to the heart of corporate law’s design, 
which relies on private enforcement to animate substantive rights. This Part 
outlines the importance of the do-the-merits-matter question and the elusive 
quest to answer it. It also introduces the stock option backdating scandal of 
2006 and 2007 and explains why that episode offers a unique opportunity to 
investigate this basic corporate law question.  
A. Do the Merits Matter in Stockholder Litigation? 
The utility of shareholder suits has been the subject of longstanding and 
contentious debate.14 Shareholder litigation could be a tool that harnesses the 
self-interest of plaintiffs’ attorneys to deter misconduct at public companies. 
Alternatively, it could be a mechanism that operates chiefly to benefit 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants at the expense of shareholders.15 The 
answer carries important policy implications: if stockholder litigation fails to 
focus on actual wrongdoing, there can be little hope that it in fact deters 
wrongdoing or that it delivers compensation to those who suffer from it. If 
there is no connection between the merits and the operation of litigation, 
stockholder litigation—an expensive system of private enforcement—would 
be in need of deep reform if not outright abolition.16  
The principal procedural hurdles in stockholder litigation, for both 
derivative and securities suits, have been shaped by the desire to inhibit 
meritless lawsuits. The requirement that a stockholder first make a demand 
on the board of directors in derivative suits, for example, has traditionally 
 
14 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 739 (1995) (“The 
suggestion that securities class actions settle for amounts unrelated to the merits of the underlying 
litigation ranks among the most contentious and analytically difficult hypotheses in the entire 
securities litigation debate.”)  
15 Under directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, managers have a strong incentive to settle 
claims. For comprehensive treatment of this issue, see BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 152-76. 
16 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 179 (suggesting that abolition of long standing practices 
might be one way to create reform); see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability 
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 286-87 (1986) (noting that the best and perhaps only justification for the derivative suit 
is “deterring large one-shot frauds” and stating that this “limited, albeit important, justification[] 
for the derivative suit in no way suggest[s] that such suits should be brought more frequently or 
that legal rules that discourage their incidence are detrimental to investors”). 
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been justified as a bulwark against nuisance suits.17 Similarly, courts and 
commentators have defended the SLC, which allows a board committee to 
wrest control of the derivative claims from the complaining stockholder, as a 
mechanism for weeding out meritless claims.18 In the securities context, the 
demanding pleading requirements and specialized mechanism for selecting a 
lead plaintiff introduced by the Private Securities Law Reform Act of 1995 
were directly aimed at reducing the volume of suits.19  
A prominent and persistent focus of reformers’ attention has been 
attorneys’ fees. Under the prevailing rule in the United States (the so-called 
American Rule), each party to litigation pays its own attorneys regardless of 
the outcome. The alternative rule—known as the English Rule—forces the 
losing party to pay the winner’s legal fees and expenses.20 A longstanding 
suspicion is that the American Rule induces meritless strike suits because 
plaintiffs (and their attorneys) can sue and offer to settle for less than the cost 
of defending the suit. Assuming that stockholders would be less likely to 
bring derivative suits if forced to bear the corporation’s cost of defense, many 
states in the middle of the twentieth century adopted security-for-expenses 
statutes.21 These statutes entitle the corporation to demand that any small 
stockholder bringing a suit post security for the corporation’s legal expenses, 
from which the corporation could recover at the termination of the suit. The 
target was explicitly stockholder suits with no merit. The Governor of New 
Jersey, upon signing that state’s statute, noted that the legislation was 
intended to “deter the filing of irresponsible suits by persons who either have 
no legitimate cause of action or who institute such action more for the 
 
17 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that a purpose of the demand 
requirement is to “provide a safeguard against strike suits”); Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186 
(N.Y. 1975) (explaining that the demand requirement is “designed to discourage ‘strike suits’ by 
shareholders making reckless charges for personal gain rather than corporate benefit”). 
18 See Black v. NuAIRE, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“The purpose of [the 
SLC statute] is to grant corporations the ability to respond effectively to the potential abuses of strike 
suits, in which a single dissenting shareholder, owning only one share of stock, may file a derivative 
suit for its nuisance value alone.”); see also Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free 
Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1799-1800 
(2004) (suggesting that an explicit purpose of the SLC “is to weed out opportunistic claims”).  
19 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 760 (2003) (“Concerns that too many suits were ‘strike suits’ led to the enactment 
of the PSLRA.”).  
20 For an overview of the differences between the two systems, see generally Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical 
Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2013).  
21 See Henry W. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California’s New 
“Security For Expenses Act” Sound Regulation?, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 399 (1949) (noting how 
California’s 1949 act follows the “questionable example” of security-for-expenses statutes in New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin).  
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personal gain of a settlement out of court than in the interest of the 
corporation or its stockholders.”22 At the time, many academic observers 
feared these statutes would upset a careful equilibrium in corporate law and 
fundamentally damage private enforcement of fiduciary duties.23 Through a 
combination of creative pleading by plaintiffs, forgiving amendments by 
legislatures, and lenient interpretations by courts,24 such dire predictions did 
not come to pass,25 and indeed it was not long before commentators 
proclaimed the revival of the derivative suit.26  
The American Rule remains a target of reform, especially in the wake of 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s May 2014 decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. 
Deutscher Tennis Bund and the subsequent legislative response. ATP Tour, 
Inc., the governing body of men’s professional tennis and a Delaware 
nonstock company, had adopted a bylaw that purported to require any league 
owner who initiated litigation against the Tour to reimburse the Tour’s legal 
fees if the plaintiff did not “obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially 
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”27 Answering 
certified questions from a federal court about the validity and enforceability 
of the bylaw, the Delaware Supreme Court held that such a bylaw is valid in 
a nonstock corporation and also noted that it would be enforceable if adopted for 
a proper purpose.28 In analyzing the proper purpose inquiry, the court observed 
that “[t]he intent to deter litigation . . . is not invariably an improper purpose.”29  
The decision commanded immediate and widespread attention for its 
implication that a public company might use a bylaw to shift from the 
 
22 Id. at 402 (quoting New Jersey Governor Walter Edge).  
23 See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York, 
32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1944) (explaining that the option for calculating the bond amount 
based on reasonable expenses required by New York was “bound to be so high (a hundred thousand 
dollars would be moderate in any sizable case) that very few individuals could possibly raise the 
bond” and that, even if the plaintiff could raise the bond, “they would rarely be willing to risk it, for 
experience has demonstrated that many unquestionably meritorious suits have been lost on 
numerous technical grounds”).  
24 See, e.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that state 
security-for-expenses statutes do not apply to federal claims).  
25 See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION: 
BESIEGING THE BOARD § 1.03 at 1-19 (1995) (“[C]leaver [sic] plaintiffs found ways to plead around 
the security-for-expenses statutes and it is the statutes, rather than the derivative action, that appear 
to be on their last leg.” (footnote omitted)).  
26 See, e.g., Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 74-75 
(1967) (noting the sharp increase in derivative actions from 1955 to 1965 and that reported numbers 
most likely reflect a small percentage of actions taken). 
27 See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014) (quoting 2006 
addition of Article 23 to ATP’s bylaws).  
28 Id. at 558-60.  
29 Id. at 560.  
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American to the English Rule.30 Critics of stockholder suits saw in the decision 
the promise of curtailing meritless litigation. Stephen Bainbridge, for example, 
noted that “we are faced with a world in which runaway frivolous litigation is 
having a major deleterious effect on U.S. capital markets,” and fee-shifting 
bylaws offer “an appropriate means of addressing the problem through private 
ordering.”31 On the other side, plaintiffs’ attorneys feared the worst, describing 
the decision as a “disaster” that “caused Delaware to secede from the union” by 
forsaking the American Rule.32 In the wake of the ATP Tour decision, the 
Delaware bar proposed a legislative amendment that would prohibit fee-shifting 
bylaws, but that proposal was initially derailed by lobbying effort by the Business 
Roundtable. While some intrepid public companies adopted fee-shifting bylaws 
after ATP,33 Delaware ultimately amended the DGCL to make fee-shifting 
bylaws explicitly impermissible over resistance from some business groups.34 
Both the existing structure of class-based stockholder litigation and the 
debate over reforms sparked by ATP turns on whether stockholder suits bear 
some relationship to merit. That question has always been in the background 
of judicial opinions on stockholder suits,35 and academics have worked to 
 
30 See, e.g., Lisa A. Rickard, Delaware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 14, 2014, 5:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-with-encouraging-
shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328 [http://perma.cc/FAH9-YE58] (describing the impact of the ATP 
Tour ruling). 
31 Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Ordered Solution to the 
Shareholder Litigation Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 17, 2014, 10:50am), http://www. 
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-case-for-allowing-fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-
privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.html [http://perma.cc/ YK3J-6KN9].  
32 Tom Hals, Delaware Upholds Fee-shifting Bylaw, Could Upend Class Actions, REUTERS (May 9, 2014, 
6:03 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/delaware-courts-fees-idUSL2N0NV1PK20140509 
[http://perma.cc/4C33-VPPA] (quoting a prominent Delaware shareholder attorney).  
33 See, e.g., Plasmatech Biopharmaceuticals, Amendment to Bylaws, Current Report (Form 8-
K), Item 5.03, Exhibit 3.1 (Mar. 2, 2015) (disclosing adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw amending 
payment of litigation costs).  
34 See Hals, supra note 13 (reporting passage of the legislation barring fee-shifting but allowing forum 
requirements); see also Tom Hals, Delaware Bans ‘Loser-Pays’ Fee-Shifting Bylaws in Corporate Class Actions, 
INS. J. (June 26, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2015/06/26/373071.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/ZRR2-JH6J].  
35 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Derivative suits may be brought for their 
nuisance value, the threat of protracted discovery and litigation forcing settlement and payment of fees 
even where the underlying suit has modest merit. Such suits may be harmful to shareholders because 
the costs offset the recovery. Thus, a continuing debate surrounding derivative actions has been over 
restricting their use to situations where the corporation has a reasonable chance for benefit.”); see also 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (“Suits sometimes were brought not 
to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon their nuisance value. They were bought off by secret 
settlements in which any wrongs to the general body of share owners were compounded by the suing 
stockholder, who was mollified by payments from corporate assets. These litigations were aptly 
characterized in professional slang as ‘strike suits.’”). 
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supply an answer for generations.36 The challenge in testing the connection 
between the merits and outcomes in stockholder litigation is that the merits 
are usually hidden.37 Plaintiffs’ attorneys may search through mountains of 
documents and depose scores of potential witnesses before they can 
determine whether a claim has merit. The researcher—with neither access to 
the fruits of discovery nor the time to review them—has little hope of 
estimating a lawsuit’s merit.38  
Early academic work on the merits of stockholder litigation drew 
inferences from observed variation in settlement amounts and attorneys’ 
fees.39 Janet Cooper Alexander’s influential study, for example, examined 
nine securities class actions and found little variation in the settlement 
amounts,40 with most settling for twenty-five percent of the alleged 
stockholder loss.41 The critical assumption of Alexander’s study was that the 
merits varied across the cases,42 and the invariance of the settlement amount 
suggested that the merits did not affect settlement.43 Alexander’s study, 
 
36 Franklin Wood produced perhaps the first study of the topic and reached dire conclusions. 
See generally FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ 
DERIVATIVE SUITS 112-13 (1944) (concluding that derivative lawsuits chiefly benefit attorneys).  
37 See Grundfest, supra note 14, at 739 (“As Samuel Johnson long ago explained to Boswell, ‘Sir, 
you do not know . . . [a cause] to be good or bad till the Judge determines it.’ A settlement means that 
a judge will never determine a cause and that its merits therefore never will be known.”) (footnote 
omitted); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class 
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 506 (1991) (“Testing these competing empirical claims would be 
impossible if it required a direct comparison of the merits of particular cases.”). 
38 See Alexander, supra note 37, at 506 (“[E]ven if these obstacles could be surmounted, the 
conclusions of such a study would ultimately amount to little more than the researcher’s subjective 
view of the merits.”). 
39 See David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs’ Decision to Sue Auditors in Securities 
Litigation: Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 J. CORP. L. 681, 687 (1999) (noting that the 
authors “assum[e] that cases differ with respect to their merits and that these differences are 
randomly distributed throughout the sample”); Alexander, supra note 37, at 511-12 (charting the 
decrease in market value for certain companies from the Initial Public Offering (IPO) to March 30, 
1984 and noting whether the company was sued over its IPO). 
40 See Alexander, supra note 37, at 512.  
41 Id. at 517 (showing that five of the nine cases studied “settled for between 24.5 and 27.5 
percent of the amount at stake” and that although the remaining cases fall outside this narrow range, 
“they can be explained by factors not related to the merits”).  
42 See id. at 507 (“[E]xperimental method is limited by the fact that we do not know for certain 
whether the cases studied actually vary as to their strength on the merits, or how they vary . . . . 
However there is reason to believe that the sample cases . . . were not all equally strong.”) Under 
that assumption, the uniformity across the settlements could only grow out of “a settlement process 
that is not responsive to the merits.” Id. Other studies have made this same assumption. See, e.g., 
Gilbertson, supra note 39, at 687 (noting that they “assum[e] that cases differ with respect to their 
merits and that these differences are randomly distributed throughout the sample”). 
43 Id. 
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alongside the contemporaneous work of Roberta Romano,44 suggested that 
the outcomes of stockholder litigation had little relationship to the 
underlying strength of the claims, and thus the fundamental mechanism of 
deterrence through litigation was broken.45  
Most work in this area has focused on federal securities litigation, and the 
common empirical approach is to rely on variables that ought to correlate 
with merit. James Bohn and Stephen Choi, for example, used an ambitious 
variety of proxies for merit in their 1996 study of securities class actions 
against IPOs prior to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA).46 They examined underwriter quality, the fraction of total 
holdings that insiders sell in the IPO, the fraction of outsiders on the pre-
offering board of directors, the potential damages (the difference between the 
IPO price and the price at the end of the class period, multiplied by the 
number of shares offered), and the capital market reaction to the filing of the 
securities suit.47  
 In post-PSLRA work, Marilyn Johnson, Karen Nelson, and A.C. 
Pritchard examined what they termed “factors related to fraud”: accounting 
restatements, earnings forecasts, and insider trading.48 Additionally, drawing 
on an insight of Joseph Grundfest,49 Choi used as proxies for merit two 
measures based on the ultimate settlement amount in his study of    post-
PSLRA securities IPO litigation.50 This study treated a suit as meritorious if 
it settled for more than $2 million,51 reasoning that “the maximum amount 
defendants will settle a nuisance claim typically will not exceed $2 million.”52 
 
44 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 55, 61 (1991) (failing to make any estimates of merit beyond the amount of settlement). See 
also, Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1486 (2004) 
(“While Romano did examine settled versus dismissed cases, a mix of both frivolous and meritorious 
suits within the set of settled cases may exist.”).  
45 Alexander, supra note 37, at 596-98. 
46 James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities 
Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 906 (1996).  
47 Id. at 949-79.  
48 Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The 
Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 630 (2007).  
49 See Grundfest, supra note 14, at 741 (suggesting that settling for more than the costs of 
defending the claims would provide “a critical signal of the defendants’ own perception of the merits 
of plaintiffs’ claims”). 
50 Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 613-14 (2007).  
51 See id. at 613 (noting that “settlements over $2 million are likely meritorious”).  
52 Id.  
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As an alternative measure, the study treated suits as meritorious if the 
settlement amounts exceeded five percent of the IPO offering amount.53  
 James Cox and Randall Thomas have employed a measure they term 
“provable loss.”54 This is a market-adjusted measure of the stock’s abnormal 
returns in response to the disclosure of the information that corrected the 
alleged misstatement or omission underlying the securities claim.55 The larger 
the share of provable loss that a case recovers, the stronger the inference that 
it was meritorious.56 Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas considered an 
extensive catalog of factors in trying to assess the merit of cases in their study 
of stockholder litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery during 1999 and 
2000.57 They considered the involvement of controlling stockholders, the 
unadjusted merger premia offered by acquirers, and the size of the monetary 
settlement to be signals of potential merit.58 They also relied on various case 
characteristics that were “perhaps the most commonly discussed perceived 
‘abusive’ features of representative litigation.”59  
Some recent papers have attempted to quantify the merits of certain 
discrete legal claims more precisely in other contexts. In their study of mutual 
fund litigation, one of the authors of this Article and John Morley examined 
lawsuits between 2000 and 2009 alleging excessive fee liability under section 
36(b) of the Investment Company Act.60 During the period they studied, the 
legal standard for 36(b) liability was that the fee in question must be “so 
 
53 See id. at 614 n.36 (“The mean offering amount for sued firms pre-PSLRA is $48.4 million 
(in 1999 dollars); the 5% threshold therefore to an average cutoff of $2.43 million.”). 
54 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1625-26 (2006); James D. Cox & Randall 
S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 (2003).  
55 Cox & Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics, supra note 54, at 768 n.100 (“The standard 
measure of damages for securities class actions is the price at which the investors purchased or sold 
the security and what that price would have been but for the misrepresentation. We refer to this as 
the provable loss for the class.”).  
56 See generally id. 
57 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 165 (2004).  
58 See id. at 200 (“[A controlling stockholder] transaction is accompanied by a high likelihood 
of substantial management agency costs.”); id. at 202 (“[T]he impact of the monetary class action 
settlements is to raise the premium paid in the lowest-priced control shareholder transactions above 
the average level for all of these transactions in our sample. In other words, acquisition-oriented 
class action litigation polices the worst control shareholder deals . . . .”).  
59 See id. at 182-92 (examining how quickly suits were filed after the announcement of a 
transaction, how many suits were filed challenging a transaction, the size of the defendants, whether 
plaintiffs are repeat players, the concentration of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, settlement rates, and 
attorney fee awards).  
60 Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do 
the Merits Matter?, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 275, 275 (2012).  
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disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services 
rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”61 
For each fund in the universe of mutual funds subject to 36(b), Curtis and 
Morley determined the fund’s unadjusted expense ratio and produced variables 
to measure the excessiveness of the fees as alternative estimates of merit.62 
They found a “somewhat modest” relationship between fund fees and the 
incidence of a lawsuit.63 By contrast, they found a strong relationship between 
fee litigation and fund family size.64  
Charles Korsmo and one of the authors of this article examined litigation 
challenging mergers and acquisitions involving Delaware-incorporated target 
firms.65 They collected the universe of merger transactions between 2004 and 
2012 where both of the major associated legal remedies—fiduciary class actions 
and stockholder appraisal petitions—were available.66 To estimate the merits 
of either legal claim, they computed a merger premium residual by subtracting 
the actual merger premium from a predicted merger premium based on size, 
industry, and year.67 They also used a going-private dummy as a proxy for 
merit.68 They found very little relationship between the merit estimates and 
the incidence or intensity of fiduciary class actions.69 By contrast, the incidence 
of appraisal—where plaintiffs can proceed only on their own behalf and not on 
behalf of the entire class of absent shareholders—was strongly associated with 
low premium residuals.70 The Korsmo and Myers paper shares a basic 
similarity with the Curtis and Morley paper in that the legal claims in both 
contexts are relatively one-dimensional. For this reason, the legal claims in 
those contexts are susceptible to an unusually transparent quantitative measure 
of merit.71  
Stock options backdating is of interest to us because it presents an even 
more tantalizing opportunity to measure the merits of legal claims. 
 
61 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).  
62 See Curtis & Morley, supra note 60, at 285-86 (“The value of the ‘Unadjusted Expense Ratio’ 
variable in our data set for each quarter is the mean of CRSP-reported expense ratios (minus load 
fees) over the four quarters prior to the quarter of observation.”). 
63 Id. at 297.  
64 See id. at 290 (explaining that “the only family-level fee variable that is positive is the one 
that adjusts for family size”). 
65 Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the 
Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 868 (2014). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 872. 
68 Id. at 874. 
69 Id. at 836. 
70 Id. 
71 See Curtis & Morley, supra note 60, at 277 (“[T]he merits of excessive fee lawsuits are 
uniquely easy to perceive.”). 
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Derivative suits commonly allege some fiduciary duty violation, and 
evaluating the merits of such a claim requires particularized knowledge that 
is unavailable without the benefit of discovery.72 Even with discovery, it 
would be quixotic to quantify such an evaluation of merit. But the gravamen 
of each backdating lawsuit is that the board retroactively granted option 
awards. As explained below, we can generate firm-level estimates of the 
likelihood of backdating and the magnitude of the damages. These measures 
of backdating activity provide unique insight into the merits of backdating 
shareholder and derivative claims. To be clear, we cannot capture every 
element of the legal claims that might be relevant. For example, in a 
derivative suit, the number of directors who participated in the backdating 
scheme might be relevant to whether demand is excused. In a securities suit, 
the state of mind of the directors or officers participating in the scheme would 
be relevant. Nevertheless, the ability to capture with reasonable precision the 
underlying wrongful activity provides a unique opportunity to evaluate 
stockholder litigation.  
B. The Backdating Scandal 
Attorneys described the backdating scandal of 2006 as “one of the 
broadest ever to sweep across corporate America,”73 rivaled only by the 
bribery and illegal payments scandal of the Watergate era.74 Backdating was 
first identified by financial economists. In the late 1990s, David Yermack 
studied option grants to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies and discovered that 
companies making option awards outperformed the market by more than two 
percent over the succeeding fifty days.75 He speculated that option grants 
were made in advance of favorable corporate news.76 In 2004, Erik Lie 
 
72 See id. at 280 (“The trouble is that the merits of securities class action and corporate 
derivative suits are very difficult to perceive.”). 
73 Nancy Kestenbaum, Paul Krieger & Dan Sella, When is Dating Illegal? Stock Options 
Investigations: Cases and Issues, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS & LITIGATORS MUST KNOW 
ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS 27, 29 (Practicing Law Inst. 2007). 
74 See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 322 (4th ed. 
2008) (quoting Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant at the SEC, “[t]his scandal has now touched 
perhaps more companies than any other single scandal, except for the one involving illegal payments 
and bribes during the Watergate era, which led to the Congressional mandate [that] companies have 
adequate internal controls.”  
75 See David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News 
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 450 (1997) (“Companies making stock option awards to their CEOs 
outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis by slightly more than 2 percent during the period 
beginning the day after the award and lasting approximately ten weeks (50 trading days).”). 
76 See id. at 450-51 (“The pattern of abnormal returns is consistent with CEOs receiving stock options 
shortly in advance of favorable news unrelated to the award.”). For more on this practice, known as spring-
  
2016] Do the Merits Matter? 307 
 
circulated a paper showing negative abnormal returns before unscheduled 
option grants in addition to positive abnormal returns afterward.77 He offered 
a new hypothesis to explain that pattern: “[T]he awards might be timed ex 
post facto, whereby the grant date is set to be a date in the past on which the 
stock price was particularly low.”78 The SEC saw the paper and opened a 
handful of investigations,79 which became public and attracted the attention 
of news media and plaintiffs’ attorneys.80 
The story took off after the Wall Street Journal published an extensive 
front-page report on backdating on March 18, 2006.81 This report—unlike the 
academic papers—identified individual firms that may have backdated, 
highlighting well-timed grants at eight firms.82 In the succeeding weeks, 
attention on backdating increased as the Wall Street Journal and other media 
outlets reported on additional companies that may have engaged in 
backdating.83 Wall Street analysts further fanned the flames: in May 2006, 
Merrill Lynch produced two reports that attracted considerable attention, 
identifying backdating companies in the high technology industry, and the 
Center for Financial Research & Analysis identified additional companies 
with potential backdating problems from among the one hundred companies 
with the largest option grants before Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX).84 As the 
 
loading, see David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73, 73 (2000) (“Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic 
voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation.”). 
77 Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 802 (2005). 
78 Id. at 803. A working paper by M.P. Narayanan and H. Nejat Seyhun circulated in 2005 
offered similar evidence and a similar explanation. M.P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do 
Managers Influence Their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option Grants 3-4 
(U. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper Series No. 927, 2005). 
79 See Peter Lattman, Backdating Scandal Ends with a Whimper, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:38 
PM),  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/backdating-scandal-ends-with-a-whimper/?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/4B59-WQLJ]; Eliot Spitzer, The 2007 Time 100: Erik Lie, TIME (May 3, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/time100/article/0,28804,1595326_1615737_1615726,00.html 
[http://perma.cc/5DR9-8F47].  
80 See, e.g., Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
11, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113167728332394467 [http://perma.cc/64ZL-T5 LC] (noting 
that Lie’s study offered evidence on the use of backdating). 
81 Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1.  
82 See id. (mentioning Affiliated Computer Services Inc., UnitedHealth Group Inc., Mercury 
Interactive Corp., Analog Devices Inc., Brooks Automation Inc., Comverse Technology Inc., and 
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp. in the text and graphics, and also Jabil Circuit in a graphic).  
83 See, e.g., Steve Stecklow, How One Company Played with Timing of Stock Options, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE (July 20, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2006/07/20/How-
one-company-played-with-timing-of-stock-options/stories/200607200487 [http://perma.cc/MV5X-6X 
5J] (describing options backdating history at Brocade Communications Systems Inc.). 
84 See David Henry, Backdated Options, Future Rules?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 22, 
2006),  http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2006-05-22/backdated-options-future-rules-businessweek-
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scrutiny directed at companies named as potential backdaters in the media 
grew, many boards of directors initiated voluntary reviews of their own past 
grant practices.85 By the end of the summer, backdating had become one of 
the biggest corporate scandals in a generation.  
For implicated firms, backdating had some predictable consequences. 
Correcting for backdating could lead to the need to restate past financial 
results.86 Companies might also violate debt covenants in the course of 
restating their financials, forcing them to deal with a default.87 Backdating 
allegations also shook investors’ confidence in a company’s management and 
in its financial reports.88 The losses in market capitalization following 
backdating allegations—on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars per 
 
business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice [http://perma.cc/9D32-H2AD] (discussing the 
identification of companies with a high risk of having backdated by a Merrill Lynch report and 
Center for Financial Research & Analysis report). 
85 See, e.g., Ben Rooney, RIM Settles Option Backdating Case, CNN MONEY (Feb. 17, 2009), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/17/technology/RIM_Backdating/?postversion=2009021716 
[http://perma.cc/GRH9-UHNG]  (“RIM said it had previously disclosed a voluntary review of its 
stock option granting practices in 2006 . . . .”). 
86 Tax and accounting rules strongly disfavored in-the-money grants. Accounting rules required 
that the difference be charged against earnings. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123 (REVISED 2004) 98 (2004). Before 
June 15, 2005, the governing standards were Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25, Accounting 
for Stock Issued to Employees, and FASB Statement No. 123: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, 
originally issued in 1995. Press Release, Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB Issues Final 
Statement on Accounting for Share-Based Payment (Dec. 16, 2004). Tax rules classified in-the-money 
options as not “performance-based” and thus subject to a $1 million limit on deductibility. See Steven 
Balsam, Taxes and Executive Compensation, ECON. POL’Y INST., Aug. 14, 2012, at 2. By backdating 
option awards, companies could deliver the  built-in value associated with an in-the-money option grant 
while capturing accounting and tax benefits by appearing to award grants at-the-money. A company 
with a backdating problem had to recalculate the intrinsic value of the option as of the “real” grant date 
and reflect that value in their financial reports. The result was to increase compensation expense in past 
periods, which had no effect on the company’s cash position but did affect earnings. The changes were 
often material enough to require a restatement of prior results. On the tax front, backdated options 
might have to be recharacterized as in-the-money options, meaning they would no longer be 
performance-based compensation and thus no longer a deductible expense. The tax effect for many 
firms, however, was not strongly negative and in some cases was positive. See Gennaro Bernile & Gregg 
A. Jarrell, The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 2, 10 (2009) 
(“[T]he available evidence seems to indicate that the tax consequences of correcting for option 
backdating are typically negligible.”). Across the cases studied by Bernile and Jarrell, the mean 
reduction was 0.4% and the median reduction was 0.09%. Id. 
87 A number of firms were notified by debtholders of an event of default, such as Amkor, Mercury 
Interactive, Sanmina-SCI; Peter Lattman & Karen Richardson, Hedge Funds Play Hardball with Firms 
Filing Late Financials, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2006), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115681425965147983 
[http://perma.cc/5QAX-VVBN] (demonstrating how hedge funds took advantage of the backdating 
scandal by targeting bondholders that missed filing deadlines).  
88 See Bernile & Jarrell, supra note 89, at 13-14 (documenting a negative 7% return for 
shareholders around the first announcement of firm-specific backdating news and larger negative 
returns—15% or 20%—over longer windows).  
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firm—were far out of proportion to any estimate of the out-of-pocket costs 
associated with handling backdating allegations.89  
Backdating also gave rise to a substantial amount of public and private 
litigation. The SEC and DOJ investigated over one hundred firms and filed 
enforcement actions against some of them. Some worried at the time that the 
SEC did not pursue cases with adequate vigor.90 But as Choi, Wiechman, and 
Pritchard have shown, the SEC poured enormous resources into backdating 
investigations, diverting attention from other areas.91 Of the criminal 
prosecutions,92 a few resulted in convictions—of former executives from 
Comverse Technology, Monster World, KB Home, and Brocade 
Communications—but not many. One commentator declared that the results 
had “not been as good as the earlier corporate fraud prosecutions.”93 
Somewhat surprisingly, federal securities suits never gained much 
traction in the backdating context. There were only thirty-six such suits filed 
and, while there were several huge settlements, most of the cases were notable 
for settling for less than many observers expected.94 The common explanation 
 
89 Compare id. at 3, 24 (describing how “the cost of lawyers and accountants hired to conduct 
internal investigations, cooperate with government agencies, and deal with shareholder litigation has 
reportedly been in the order of several million dollars”), with M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & 
H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 
1637-38 (2007) (reporting an “average value loss” of about $389 million at firms examined). 
90 See Marcy Gordon, Execs Falling in Options Probe, INSIDEBAYAREA.COM (Feb. 17, 2007), 
https://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_5249134?source=rss [http://perma.cc/93NW-EPZE] (“[T]he pace 
of enforcement actions in corporate America’s biggest fiasco of 2006 still is lagging, in the view of some 
critics and observers.”).  
91 See Stephen J. Choi, Anat Carmy Wiechman & A.C. Pritchard, Scandal Enforcement at the 
SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 542, 549 (2013) 
(documenting a “quick shift in enforcement priorities suggest[ing] that the SEC declined to pursue 
[non-backdating] accounting cases that the SEC otherwise would have pursued in order to free up 
resources to pursue backdating investigations”). 
92 The companies that were targets (or whose executives were targets) included KB Home, 
Brocade Communications, Comverse Technology, Monster Worldwide, McAfee, and Take-Two 
Interactive. See Spotlight on Stock Options Backdating, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/optionsbackdating.htm [http://perma.cc/83C3-2YDJ] (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2015).  
93 Peter J. Henning, Behind the Fade-out of the Options Backdating Cases, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 30, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/behind-the-fade-out-of-
options-backdating-cases/?-r=0 [http://perma.cc/6VH5-FYGV] (“[T]he cases turned out to be 
much more difficult to win because the conduct had neither the visceral appeal nor the impact that 
accounting fraud had. No company’s survival was threatened by backdating, and the options 
practices involved accounting and tax issues that were often murky, allowing defendants to argue 
successfully in some cases that they did not believe they were engaged in wrongdoing.”). 
94 See Cary O’Reilly, Option Backdating Spurs Few Lawsuits, SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 2006, 
at C2 (“The options backdating that has cost at least 19 U.S. executives their jobs resulted in only 
eight federal class-action lawsuits in the year’s first half.”); Dawn Kopeki, Backdating: Why Penalties 
Are Puny, BUS. WEEK. (June 17, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-06-
  
310 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 291 
 
for the absence of much securities litigation is that the stock prices of 
implicated companies did not drop sufficiently on backdating news to 
generate large damages.95 The longer term market penalty uncovered by 
academic studies,96 of course, suggests that the market reactions were in fact 
sometimes large, but plaintiffs’ attorneys nevertheless opted against bringing 
many securities claims.  
Derivative litigation was overwhelmingly the enforcement mechanism of 
choice for plaintiffs’ attorneys. As we show below, shareholders filed over 600 
derivative lawsuits based on backdating allegations.97 In a derivative claim, 
the damages do not depend on the stock price reaction to backdating news. 
Instead, damages depend on the magnitude of the ill-gotten gains associated 
with the practice.98  
There has been very little empirical work on private litigation over 
backdating. Two studies that documented the extent of the multiforum trend 
in stockholder litigation relied on surveys of where backdating derivative 
suits were filed.99 In addition, Bernile and Jarrell investigated whether the 
stock price movements they documented could have been due to anticipation 
of stockholder lawsuits, which would impose costs on firms.100 Not 
distinguishing between securities lawsuits and shareholder derivative 
lawsuits, they found that plaintiffs targeted firms where backdating likely 
took place and firms with more assets.101 
 
17/backdating-why-penalties-are-puny [http://perma.cc/LBF5-44V9] (“The more than yearlong 
probe into options backdating . . . is nearing completion. The surprising upshot: much smaller fines 
than anyone expected.”).  
95 See Ashby Jones, Firms Settle Backdating Suits: Some Private Cases End in Agreements; More 
Deals Ahead?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A15 (“[B]ecause word of options backdating typically 
didn’t lead to significant drops in share prices, only about 30 class-action lawsuits have been filed.”); 
see also Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law: Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and 
the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 973, 992 (2007) (explaining that damage issues, 
compounded with causation questions, inhibited securities class actions).  
96 See Bernile & Jarrell, supra note 86, at 13-18 (charting the impact of backdating allegations 
on market capitalization in the days immediately following the news, and up to 80 days later). 
97 See infra Table 3. 
98 As Baker and Griffith have noted, “the backdating of options is . . . a paradigmatic derivative 
claim—any harm suffered by shareholders is strictly derivative of the harm suffered by the 
corporation itself.” BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 29. 
99 See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 479 
(using filing information from two sets of case data, “derivative suits against firms implicated in the 
2006 stock options backdating scandal . . . [and] class action lawsuits filed against target firms in the 
250 largest mergers” from 2009 through 2011); see also John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, 
Is Delaware Losing its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 611-12 (2012) (using similar filing 
information from case data).  
100 See Bernile & Jarrell, supra note 86, at 18 (examining stock prices’ reaction to firm-specific 
backdating news). 
101 See id. at 19 tbl. 7 (illustrating the relation of abnormal returns around news event dates). 
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II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We combine data on stock option grants with hand-collected data on the 
incidence of stockholder derivative litigation alleging backdating. We 
augment this data with additional information on securities class actions and 
SEC investigations. This Part describes our data and important variables 
used in the analysis below. 
A. Methodology for Identifying Backdating Activity 
We obtained data on stock option awards at public companies from the 
Thomson Financials Insider Filing database. The data set includes all insider 
transactions reported on Form 4. We construct a database of option grants 
by filtering on insider transactions to identify grants between January 1, 1996, 
and August 29, 2002, when changes to reporting rules made backdating much 
more difficult. We eliminate grants to low-level executives, as in Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Whitby.102 This leaves a dataset of 181,852 option grants across 
8520 firms.  
To determine whether a particular option grant is backdated, we compute 
the return on the underlying stock in the twenty trading days before the grant 
and the 20 days after the grant.103 The post-grant change in price minus the 
pre-grant change in price is the reversal. Intuitively, the reversal measures 
the depth of the “V” around the option grant and captures both increases in 
price after the grants and avoidance of losses before the grant. We compute 
the reversal for all grants in the dataset. We then compute the reversal for 
1,000,000 hypothetical grant dates by making random draws from our sample 
of firms and dates over the same time period as our sample of option grants.  
To estimate the probability that a grant is backdated, we match the grant 
to the randomly generated sample of hypothetical grant dates with the same 
volatility level and compute the proportion of hypothetical grants with lower 
reversal. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns and captures the tendency of a firm’s share prices to change quickly. 
More volatile stocks are more likely to have a high or low reversal on a given 
date than less volatile stocks, so controlling for volatility is important. The 
 
102 See John Bizjak, Michael Lemmon & Ryan Whitby, Option Backdating and Board Interlocks, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 4821, 4827-28 (2009) (describing how one of the filters applied to the sample 
data was removing options grants to lower level executives). 
103 Our methodology for identifying backdated options is similar to Bizjak, Lemmon and 
Whitby. See id. at 4827-28 (analyzing 4,189,765 grant observations, narrowed by several filters that 
result in a final sample of 62,364 firm-grant-day observations). The twenty trading-day window 
approximately captures a calendar month.  
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result is a volatility-controlled estimate of the likelihood that a grant on a 
randomly chosen date would have a reversal at least as large as the observed 
reversal of the grant. This can be understood as a probabilistic measure of the 
likelihood that a grant was backdated.  
To estimate backdating at the company level, we use a similar technique. 
For a company with k option grant dates in the sample, we draw 1000 samples 
of k options at random from the set of hypothetical grants with the same 
volatility decile. We compute the cumulative reversal across all k option 
grants for the firm in question as well as all 1000 draws of k hypothetical 
grants. We estimate the probability of the cumulative reversal occurring 
randomly by observing the proportion of random draws that have cumulative 
reversal larger than the observed reversal. The estimated probability that a 
company engaged in backdating is the proportion of random draws of k grants 
with lower total reversal.  
Using these company-level estimates of the likelihood that the observed 
reversals are random, it is possible to estimate the proportion of likely 
backdating firms in the sample. The company-level probabilities are p-values, 
and we can take p < 0.05 percent as the confidence cutoff for backdating firms. 
Thirteen percent of the firms meet this cutoff. It does not follow, of course, 
that all of these firms backdated. Five percent of the   non-backdating firms 
would have p < 0.05 by chance. While the true proportion of non-backdating 
firms is not directly observable, it is nevertheless possible to estimate this 
quantity using statistical methods developed for measuring false discoveries 
in mixed samples.104  
To estimate the proportion of firms with aggregate reversal with p < 0.05 
that did not in fact engage in backdating, we first choose a cutoff p-value , 
below which we assume that no firms engaged in backdating. We use  = 0.6. 
That is, we assume that firms whose cumulative reversal was worse than sixty 
percent of randomly generated reversals did not backdate. We then estimate 
the number of firms with p < 0.05 that did not backdate as follows:  
	( < . ) ∗ [ ( > . ) 	 − 	 ] 
 
 
104 See generally John D. Storey, A Direct Approach to False Discovery Rates, 64 J. ROYAL STAT. 
SOC. 479, 494-95 (2002) (proposing a new approach to multiple-hypothetical testing through 
analyzing false discovery rates). The methodology was applied to mutual fund performance in 
Laurent Barras, Olivier Scaillet & Russ Wermers, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: 
Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179 (2010). 
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Where W(p < y) is the number of firms with a probability of random reversal 
less than y, and N is the number of firms in the sample. Intuitively, this uses 
the proportion of firms with high p-values that likely did not engage in 
backdating to estimate the proportion of firms with p < 0.05 that did not 
backdate. Figure 1 illustrates why this estimation intuitively makes sense. 
  
 
Figure 1: Estimation of Proportion of Backdating Firms,  
Controlling for Genuine Luck 
 
Based on the equation above, we estimate that there are 855 firms in our 
sample—or about 10%% of total firms with option grant information—that 
can be said with 95% confidence to have positive cumulative reversal around 
option grants that is not the result of random variation. This is lower than 
the estimate of aggregate options backdating activity of Edelson and 
Whisenant, who estimate that about 16% of their sample of 4008 firms 
engaged in backdating with 95% probability using a different methodology 
for measuring grant probabilities, but still much higher than the number of 
firms publicly implicated in the practice of backdating.105  
 
105 See Rick Edelson & Scott Whisenant, A Study of Companies with Abnormally Favorable Patterns 
of Executive Stock Option Grant Timing 1-36 (Aug. 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/backdate-08182009.pdf [http://perma.cc/B8Mp-7KUZ].   
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Our methodology identifies non-random patterns in firm grants. It is of 
course possible that these non-random patterns are not the result of backdating, 
but of some other practice like spring-loading,106 where the disclosure of positive 
news is timed to follow a grant of options. The effect for the grant recipient is 
essentially the same—options values are increased—but the legal analysis is 
different because backdating involves a deliberate violation of a stockholder-
approved options plan and the filing of a demonstrably false document with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.107  
To determine the proportion of backdating (as opposed to, say, spring 
loading) in our sample, we compare our primary sample of grants to grants 
where backdating was not possible but other methods of increasing option 
value, like spring loading, could have still worked. In particular, we compare 
our main sample of grants in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era, when companies had 
a long period in which to report option grants, to grants in the post-Sarbanes–
Oxley era that were reported within one day of being issued.108 Applying the 
methodology described above to the samples of grants, we find that the 
incidence of unusually lucky grants is 80% lower among grants for which 
backdating was impossible compared with our main sample of pre-SOX 
grants.109 This suggests, consistent with the finance literature, that the majority 
of abnormal performance around grants was due to backdating.110  
B. Description of Backdating Variables 
Based on the methodology described above, we derive three measures of 
backdating activity. First, we use one minus the firm-level p-value on 
cumulative reversals around grant dates as a measure of the overall degree to 
which a firm is likely to have engaged in backdating. For convenience of 
 
106 See Robert M. Daines, Grant R. McQueen & Robert J. Schonlau, Right on Schedule: CEO 
Option Grants and Opportunism 41 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=2363148 
[http://perma.cc/Vn6W-8W7D] (finding that data on abnormal returns around scheduled option 
grants due to spring-loading appears very similar to data on abnormal returns due to backdating).  
107 See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 592-93 (Del. Ch. 2007) (distinguishing the 
legal analysis of backdating from that of spring-loading). 
108 Post-SOX, the reporting period was shortened to two days. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2012). But 
Lie, using pre-SOX data, showed that backdating occurred within that two-day window. Lie, supra 
note 77, at 809. As such, even the post-SOX sample is tainted by backdating. In the sample of grants 
reported within one day, backdating was all but impossible. Prior to SOX, almost no grants were 
immediately reported.  
109 This is consistent with Randall A. Herron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock 
Price Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 (2007), the paper that 
first identified the backdating explanation for abnormal returns.  
110 See id.; see also Randall A. Herron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top 
Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated? 55 MGMT. SCI. 513 (2009).  
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reference, we refer to this as the Firm-Level Backdating Probability. While 
this is a reasonable name for the variable, it is subject to some measurement 
error. For example, a firm that backdated only once but issued many options 
grants may be overlooked by this measure if the cumulative effect of the truly 
random grants conceals the effect of the backdated grant. Such a firm may be 
measured to have a low backdating probability even if the single grant could 
be shown to be backdated with near-certainty. Second, if a firm engaged in 
other practices that created abnormal reversal, such as timing bad news before 
option grants and positive news after options grants, then this could be 
incorporated into the backdating measure, even if the firm did not actually 
backdate options. Nevertheless, the firm-level measure is helpful in 
identifying firms that backdated frequently and with measurable economic 
consequences.  
We also compute the p-value of individual option grants. We term grants 
that have reversal with an estimated likelihood of occurring randomly of less 
than 0.05 “lucky” grants.111 Of course, some significant proportion of lucky 
grants were, in fact, the result of luck, since there is a one in twenty likelihood 
of such a grant resulting from chance. Moreover, firms that issued many 
grants are more likely to have lucky grants. To get a more detailed view of 
firm-level backdating activity, we use the percentage of each firm’s grants that 
were lucky to construct the variable Percent Lucky Grants, which implicitly 
controls for the frequency with which firms granted options. This measures 
the incidence of backdating but, again, does not fully capture the scope of 
backdating activity as it does not distinguish large grants from small ones.  
To measure the total effect of backdating on firms’ financial reports, we 
compute the Total Abnormal Reversal. For each lucky grant, we multiply the 
number of options times the reversal, from twenty days prior to the grant to 
twenty days after, times the exercise price of the option grant. If we assume 
that the average reversal of non-backdated grants was zero, then this measure 
approximates the degree to which the option was “in the money” on the day 
it was issued and thus the compensation expense that should have been 
recorded as a result. Note that this value is different from the actual economic 
impact of the backdating, since the accounting standards at the time did not 
attempt an actual valuation of the options.112  
 
111 For another article using the term “lucky grants,” see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein 
& Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2364 (2010). In that study, the term 
refers to grants made on the day of the month that had the lowest stock price. Id. at 2364. While 
obviously aimed at measuring the same activity, this is a distinct definition.  
112 See Walker, supra note 3, at 564, 594 n.135 (2007) (noting that an option granted a dollar in 
the money may increase in value less than twenty cents to the recipient). 
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For our regression results, we use both the Firm-Level Backdating 
Probability and the Total Abnormal Reversal as the variables of interest. 
Firm-Level Backdating Probability captures the likelihood that a company 
backdated while Total Abnormal Reversal correlates with the value taken out 
of the firm through backdating. These variables constitute our main estimates 
of the merits of backdating derivative cases.  
We also collect data on other measures of backdating activity that help 
validate our merits measures. First, our data includes a list of firms investigated 
by the SEC for backdating.113 One might assume, and indeed we confirm 
below, that the SEC focused on the worst offenders, so this variable is a strong 
indicator of significant backdating activity. Second, our data includes the size 
of restatements issued by firms that acknowledged backdating issues. While 
not every firm that backdated restated its financials, the size of the resulting 
restatement for those firms that did is a measurement of how widespread and 
aggressive the backdating activity was.114 Third, we code whether each firm 
appeared on one of several lists of likely backdaters produced by media and 
investment analysts. In unreported regressions, we confirm that all these 
measures of backdating are strongly correlated with Firm-Level Backdating 
Probability and Total Abnormal Reversal with p < 0.01. 
We use Firm-Level Backdating Probability and, separately, Total 
Abnormal Reversal as estimates of the strength of a stockholder suit making 
backdating allegations. The variable Firm-Level Backdating Probability 
supplies an estimate of legal liability in a fiduciary-duty-based claim because 
backdating was a straightforward violation of law that gave rise to damages.115 
The variable Total Abnormal Reversal captures the extent to which the 
options were in the money when granted, and since the likely remedy in a 
fiduciary based-suit would be rescission in one form or another,116 this 
 
113 We identify the subset of firms that faced an SEC investigation by aggregating the Wall Street 
Journal’s list of SEC-investigated firms with NERA’s similar list. See DR. PATRICK CONROY ET AL., 
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, OPTIONS BACKDATING: ACCOUNTING, TAX AND ECONOMICS 9-12 
(2006), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Backdating_ Part_2_ 
0613.pdf [http://perma.cc/E5SN-UFL4]; Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 
2008), http://www.wsj.com/public/page/perfectpayday.html [http://perma.cc/76CM-DXFX]; see 
also Choi, Wiechman & Pritchard, supra note 91, at 549 tbl.1 (showing the number of backdating 
investigations initiated by the SEC between 2004 and 2007). 
114 See Bernile & Jarrell, supra note 89 at 19 tbl. 7 (including the size of restatement as a control 
for the market response to backdating). 
115 See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 358 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that shareholders’ 
allegations that company directors purposefully made false representations regarding the dates on 
which options were granted were sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule and defeat a motion 
to dismiss).  
116 See id. at 361 (“Whether or not the options are exercised, the Court will be able to fashion a 
remedy. For example, this Court might rely on expert testimony to determine the true value of the option 
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variable correlates with the magnitude of the potential damages. Together, 
these variables are estimates of liability and damages in a fiduciary suit. They 
measure the merits of a claim that the company could bring against those who 
engaged in backdating.  
In derivative litigation, the stockholder seeks to stand in the shoes of the 
company to press its claims. Thus, our measures of merit only apply to 
private litigation in which the private plaintiffs’ attorney successfully gained 
control of the case. To do that, the private suit must survive a motion to 
dismiss for failure to make demand on the board.117 Only when the board is 
conflicted—meaning that the board members themselves are the targets of 
the backdating suit—can the private attorney avoid the demand 
requirement.118 To investigate this possibility, we examined the effect of 
board turnover on our results. In unreported tests, we found that director 
turnover at the backdating company between 2001 and 2006 had no effect on 
our targeting or litigation outcomes below.  
C. Data on Litigation over Backdating 
We compiled data on stockholder derivative cases by hand. As the 
backdating story grew in the news, media entities and other analysts compiled 
lists of firms implicated in backdating. We collected all four of these lists and 
combined them into one master list of firms implicated in backdating.119 We 
find 264 firms where backdating was publicly alleged to have occurred, of 
which the option grant and other stock price data necessary to be included in 
the sample was available for 255.120  
 
grants or simply rescind them.”); see also Jay W. Eisenhofer & Cynthia A. Calder, Options Backdating from 
the Shareholders’ Perspective, 3 SEC. LITIG. REP. 8 (Mar. 2007) (“Shareholders who have sued to seek redress 
for backdating have frequently demanded outright rescission of the backdated options.”).  
117 See Amy M. Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead Plaintiff in 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 908 (2009) (“[O]nce a plaintiff files a claim, 
the court will hear motions and arguments centered on the plaintiff’s claim of futility.”). 
118 See id. at 902 (“[C]ourts will excuse demand when it would be futile.”). 
119 See GLASS, LEWIS & CO., YELLOW CARD TREND ALERT, STOCK-OPTION BACKDATING 
SCANDAL app. A (2007) (listing 257 firms); RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, 
OPTIONS BACKDATING: THE STATISTICS OF LUCK 9-12 (2007) (listing 198 firms); Kevin M. LaCroix, 
Options Backdating Lawsuits: Settlements, Dismissals, Denials, THE D&O DIARY (Oct. 28, 2007), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/10/articles/options-backdating/the-list-options-backdating-settlements-
dismissals-and-denials/ [http://perma.cc/P4DX-L6YL] (click on hyperlink at “here,” the last word in the first 
paragraph) (listing 169 firms); Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.wsj.com/public/page/perfectpayday.html [http://perma.cc/76CM-DXFX] (listing 141 firms). 
120 To be included, a firm must have at least one option grant to high level executives from 
1996 to 2002 reported in the Thomson Reuters Insider Filings Database, have sufficient returns data 
in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to compute reversal for twenty days 
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For each of these 255 firms, we examined its periodic disclosure filings 
with the SEC to determine whether the firm had attracted stockholder 
derivative litigation.121 For each firm with disclosed litigation, we collected 
data on all of the complaints against the firm by examining documents in 
court dockets, SEC disclosures, and contemporaneous news reports. For each 
company, we compiled the filing date, the venue, the filing attorneys, and the 
lead counsel (if the case was consolidated). We note the ultimate outcomes 
of cases: whether settled, consolidated with other cases, or dismissed. If the 
case was settled, we collected the details of the settlement including any 
amounts paid to the company, option repricings or cancellations, corporate 
governance changes, the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee,122 any D&O insurance 
payment (if disclosed), and whether anyone objected to the settlement. If a 
court dismissed the case, we noted the grounds. We also noted if the case 
ended in some other way, such as bankruptcy or merger.  
In order to identify securities class action claims, we used a 
comprehensive list from Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC.123 The list 
includes the companies sued, whether the case was dismissed, and the size of 
any settlement paid to the class.124  
One variable we could not collect was the plaintiffs’ stock holdings. The 
plaintiffs’ holdings were rarely noted in court pleadings. When disclosed, 
however, the holdings appeared trivial. For example, in a fight over which of 
three plaintiffs would be lead in a consolidated case involving Power 
Integrations, the judge requested information on their holdings. One plaintiff 
did not respond, another claimed to hold two shares, and the third plaintiff 
was unreachable, according to his attorney.125  
The filing dates of the derivative cases were clustered between early 2006 
and early 2007, mirroring public attention on the phenomenon. Figure 2 
presents a histogram of derivative filings over time. There were only a 
handful of backdating cases filed before the Wall Street Journal published its 
 
on either side of the grant, and be listed in Compustat to permit matching between the Thomson 
Reuters data and the CRSP data.  
121 We believe that any firms targeted by a backdating suit would have disclosed this fact in its 
SEC filings. Nevertheless, if a firm did not disclose a backdating suit, it would not be identified as 
having been sued in our sample.  
122 We collected both the negotiated attorneys’ fees, the amount requested, and the amount 
awarded. At Maxim, for example, the settlement stipulation allowed the plaintiffs to ask for up to 
$15.5 million, but in their fee application they sought a smaller number.  
123 ADAM SAVERT, KURTZMAN, OPTIONS BACKDATING SECURITY CLASS ACTIONS: 
TALLYING UP THE SCORE 2-4 (Dec. 17, 2013).  
124 Id. 
125 Declaration of Shawn A. Williams, Quaco v. Balakrishnan, No. 06-cv-02811 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 21, 2006); see also Quaco v. Balakrishnan, No. 06-cv-02811 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 9, 2007) . 
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front page story on March 16, 2006.126 Also, 90% of all cases were filed 
between April 2006 and March 2007.  
As has been noted in other work, the venue selections by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys were skewed towards federal court and, even when filed in state 
court, out of the state of incorporation.127 Table 1 shows the venues selected 
by firms, sorted by the selecting firms’ state of incorporation.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Filing Dates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 Forelle & Bandler, supra note 81. 
127 See, e.g., Armour, Black & Cheffins, supra note 99, at 621 (explaining that suits against 
Delaware companies have become more common in non-Delaware state and federal courts).  
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Table 1: Venue Choices of Derivative Plaintiffs 
Table 1.A: Filing Choices by Firm Incorporation 
Incorporation type 
No. 
cos. 
No. 
suits 
No. filed 
in fed. 
court 
No. filed 
in inc. 
state 
No. filed 
in other 
states 
Delaware 119 475 266 18 190 
Non-Delaware (Inc. 
in HQ state) 
39 154 101 53 . 
Non-Delaware (Inc. 
not in HQ state) 
8 27 13 5 9 
 
Table 1.B: Venues Ranked by Number of Filings 
Venue # filings 
N.D. Cal. 150 
Superior Court of California, Santa Clara County 52
C.D. Cal. 51
D. Mass. 30
S.D.N.Y. 19
Delaware Court of Chancery 18
Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County 18
Superior Court of California, Orange County 18
E.D.N.Y. 15
New York County Supreme Court 14
D. Minn. 13
D.N.J. 10
 
 Even though the basic fiduciary allegations in backdating suits are state 
law claims, they can be filed in federal court either by alleging diversity 
among the parties or by adding a federal cause of action,128 such as one based 
on faulty proxy disclosures.129 As Table 1 shows, shareholders filed a majority 
 
128 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32 (2012) (granting federal courts personal jurisdiction over litigants 
under diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction). 
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2012) (providing a private right of action against a company that made, 
inter alia, “false or misleading [representations] with respect to any material fact” in its proxy 
disclosures). 
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of backdating suits outside of the incorporation state regardless of the state 
of incorporation.  
Figures 3.A and 3.B present trees of case outcomes. Each node in the trees 
show the number of cases that progressed to the procedural stage indicated. 
Of the 255 in-sample firms that appeared on a public list of backdaters, 161 
firms were sued. Only thirty-three suits were dismissed outright, with an 
additional dismissal occurring after a special litigation committee (SLC) was 
formed. Interestingly, of the thirty-nine cases that made use of an SLC, only 
eight SLCs recommended that the case be dismissed. In the majority of cases 
surviving the motion to dismiss, settlement was the most common outcome. 
 
Table 2: Option Grant Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD
Underlying 
Shares 
184,013.6 1,361,147 
Reversal        
(-30,30) 
.0364671 .3070469 
Probability of 
Greater 
Reversal  
.46976 .2968888 
Lucky Grant 
Indicator       
(p < 0.05) 
.0703017 .2556558 
 
N=181,852 Option Grants 
 
Table 3: Lawsuits 
 
Variable Mean SD  
Distinct Grants 28.53416 14.16644  
Total Complaints Filed 4.118012 2.905553  
SEC Investigation Flag 0.627329  
Restatement Flag 0.57764  
Restatement Size ($ Millions) 65.46894 233.8479  
 
N = 161 Lawsuits, 663 distinct complaints 
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Figure 3: Outcomes for Derivative and Securities Class Action Cases 
 
Figure 3.A: Derivative Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.B: Securities Class Actions 
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 While settlement amounts in securities class actions are readily 
available,130 settlements in derivative backdating suits often involved forms 
of settlement consideration that are hard to value. In reviewing settlement 
agreements, we found that settlements often involved cancellation of some 
options, repricing of others, payments by certain defendants, payments by 
D&O insurers, and corporate governance changes. Moreover, companies 
often pursued some or all of these remedies outside of the process of settling 
the derivative claims, but nevertheless still during the pendency of the claims. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys sometimes executed a settlement agreement that 
mentioned no benefits to the company, but in their fee applications, sought 
to claim credit for other developments. At Semtech, for example, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that their efforts “confer[red] substantial benefits 
upon Semtech and its shareholders in the form of the cancellation and/or 
repricing of options with a realizable value of over $9 million and the 
implementation of significant corporate governance reforms, internal 
controls measures and equity award procedures and practices.”131 The 
repricings and cancellations at Semtech, however, had occurred long before 
the settlement of the derivative claims.132 The settlement agreement did not 
even mention repricings or cancellations.133 When settlements did reprice or 
cancel options, they were seldom explicit about which grants were cancelled, 
making valuation impossible. 
Thus, we rely on attorneys’ fees as a proxy for settlement magnitude in 
derivative cases. We observe attorneys’ fees in 86 cases. The mean attorneys’ 
fee in the settlement of backdating claims was $3,006,000 and the median was 
$3,751,000. When claims were pending in multiple courts, companies would 
sometimes reach separate settlements with the attorneys in each jurisdiction, 
or sometimes the settlement would expressly allocate the fees among the 
various attorneys.134 We measure fees as the total settlement attorneys’ fees 
for each targeted company. 
 
130 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 814 (describing “plentiful” data available on federal securities 
class action settlement amounts). 
131 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Approval of 
Derivative Settlement at 1, In re Semtech Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 06-CV-03510 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
5, 2009) (No. 113). 
132 See Semtech Corp., Amended Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (Mar. 29, 2007) (describing 
the cancellations and repricings). The parties to the derivative suit reached filed notice of their 
settlement on June 30, 2008—more than a year after the repricings and cancellations. See In re 
Semtech Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 06-CV-03510 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2009) (No. 101).  
133 For the text of the settlement stipulation, see Stipulation of Settlement, Semtech, No. 06-
CV-03510 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (No. 105).  
134 For example, the NVIDIA settlement agreement provided as follows:  
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III. RESULTS 
This Part presents the results of our analyses. We examine which 
companies were targeted by backdating lawsuits, the number of complaints 
filed, which claims were dismissed, settlement size for securities class actions 
and the related measure of attorneys’ fees for derivative suits, and the use and 
outcomes of special litigation committees.  
A. Targeting 
The number of firms implicated publicly in options backdating is smaller 
than our estimate of the number of firms that engaged in backdating with 
high probability. A majority, but not all, of publicly-implicated firms were 
sued derivatively, and only a subset of those firms were targeted by securities 
class actions. This makes the question of which firms were sued for 
backdating an interesting one, as some companies that backdated with high 
confidence were never subject to suit, or even publicly implicated in 
backdating.135 Our empirical estimate of the number of firms that engaged in 
backdating provides a partial explanation of why some firms may have 
escaped suit: it is not possible to determine, based purely on reversal around 
grant dates, whether a firm engaged in backdating, because some firms will 
have high reversal by happenstance.136 While we can estimate the total 
number of firms that likely backdated options, identifying specific firms is 
 
Subsequent to the negotiation of the substantive terms of the settlement of the Actions 
and the execution of memoranda of understanding with respect to both the California 
Actions and the Delaware Action, Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the California Actions and the 
Delaware Action negotiated an attorneys’ fee and expense provision with counsel for 
NVIDIA, reaching an agreement that NVIDIA would pay, subject to court approval, 
attorneys’ fees and expenses in the aggregate amount of $7.25 million to resolve on a 
global basis any and all claims regarding NVIDIA’s historical stock option granting 
practices. Plaintiffs’ Counsel then separately negotiated an allocation for the overall fee 
and expense amount of $2,465,000 for Federal Plaintiffs’ Counsel, $2,030,000 for Santa 
Clara Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and $2,755,000 for Delaware Plaintiffs’ Counsel.  
Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement of Derivative Litigation at 19, In re NVIDIA Corp. 
Derivative Litig., No. 06-CV-06110 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2008) (No. 157). 
135 Our list of firms publicly implicated in backdating numbers 264, with sufficient data to 
include 255 of those firms in the sample.  
136 For this reason, Lie expressed skepticism about identifying backdating at individual firms. 
See Lie, supra note 77, at 811 (“[A]lthough I show aggregate evidence that retroactive timing occurs, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that such timing takes place in individual cases.”). The risk 
of Type I error—incorrectly identifying a firm as a backdater when it in fact is not—falls as our p-
value cutoff falls. For example, Edelson and Whisenant found 141 firms that had abnormally 
favorable returns at a p-value of 0.0005, and only 2 firms would be expected to have such attractive 
returns by chance. Edelson & Whisenant, supra note 105, at 7. 
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another matter. Nevertheless, the question of which firms were targeted for 
private suit, and how those firms compare to those that are, say, targeted by 
the SEC is an interesting one. 
We begin by plotting, in Figure 4, relative densities of Firm-Level 
Backdating Probability for four groups of firms: firms investigated by the 
SEC, firms sued privately, firms implicated in options backdating by lists 
compiled by the Wall Street Journal and other publications described above,137 
and the full sample of firms. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparative Density of Backdating Probability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.  
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Figure 5: Kernel Density Plot for Non-Overlapping Groups of Firms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Comparative Density of Backdating Probability for Securities 
Class Actions and Derivative Suits 
 
  
 Firms may fall into more than one of these categories; for example, a firm 
may have been investigated by the SEC and also sued privately. In this plot, 
firms in multiple groups are treated as members of both groups. Thus, the 
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curve for private suits includes, for example, firms that were both sued and 
the subject of SEC investigations.  
If option grants were assigned randomly, the density plot would be flat, 
and firms would be lucky and unlucky in equal numbers. The plots, however, 
are skewed with a greater density of firms on the higher end of the probability 
distribution, showing that firms implicated in backdating were indeed 
“luckier” in their grants than other firms. Figure 4 also reveals that sued firms 
and firms investigated by the SEC had even more striking grant reversals 
than firms publicly implicated. Such a relationship is elementary: implicated 
firms were very likely to have backdated, as were firms sued or investigated 
for backdating. What is more surprising is that the kernel density for private 
suits is above the curve for implicated firms. That suggests that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys exercised some discretion. While there are many more private suits 
than SEC investigations, the private suits, in the aggregate, do not appear to 
be of much lower quality.  
Figure 5 plots slightly different kernel density curves, this time using non-
overlapping groups so that the comparison is between firms with SEC 
investigations and privately-sued firms with no SEC investigation. The 
likelihood of backdating for the privately-sued firms that were not investigated 
by the SEC appears to be lower than that of the SEC-investigated firms but 
higher than that of firms publicly implicated in backdating that were not sued, 
once again suggesting some selection on the merits.  In this plot, the curve for 
sued firms is well above the curve for implicated-but-unsued firms.   
Figure 6 compares backdating probability in securities class actions with 
backdating probability in derivative suits. The figure shows that class action 
complaints were more likely to be brought against companies with a significantly 
higher likelihood of backdating than derivative suits. The class action defendants 
appear to be the most egregious backdaters among the firms implicated.  
An important question suggested by the density plots is the extent to 
which plaintiffs’ attorneys were selective in targeting firms for backdating 
lawsuits based on the merits, controlling for other covariates that might affect 
selection. Tables 4.A and 4.B addresses this question using logit regressions, 
with the incidence of a private lawsuit as the dependent variable. The 
question is whether variables that measure merit matter once we include 
covariates that are not directly related to merit. The table presents two 
regressions for Firm-Level Backdating Probability and the logarithm of Total 
Abnormal Reversal,138 with and without controls for SEC investigations, and 
 
138 There is a strong rightward skew to Total Abnormal Returns reflecting the higher baseline 
levels of options compensation used at large firms. To reduce the skew and improve model fit, we 
use the logarithm of Total Abnormal Reversal in this and the other regression tables.  
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also includes controls for logarithm of firm size. The sample for these 
regressions is the subset of firms publicly implicated in the options 
backdating scandal.139 The regressions therefore implicitly control for public 
identification as a backdater.  
Firm-Level Backdating Probability and Total Abnormal Reversal are 
strongly predictive of a derivative lawsuit in Figures 1 and 3. This suggests that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys chose, from among the publicly implicated cases, a set of 
firms to target for suit that were more likely to have backdated, and to have 
done so more egregiously than the typical firm implicated in the scandal.  
Models 2 and 4 include a control for an SEC investigation. In Models 2 
and 4, the backdating activity measures continue to be significant, albeit 
weaker, when the control for SEC investigations is included, suggesting that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys add additional selectivity on the merits. That is, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys did not simply piggyback on SEC investigations, which 
would have nevertheless been a form of merit-selectivity, but independently 
identified cases of relatively high backdating activity.  
 The control for firm size is highly significant in the Firm-Level 
Backdating Probability models. The control is less significant, though still 
positive, in the Total Abnormal Reversal regressions. The reduced 
significance for firm size in Models 3 and 4 is likely due to a strong correlation 
between firm size and the logarithm of Total Abnormal Reversal, reflecting 
the higher value of option grants at larger firms with higher-paid executives. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a correlation between firm size and the 
likelihood of being targeted in three of the four models, even controlling for 
backdating activity, potentially suggesting a deep-pockets effect.  
Table 4.B presents parallel results for securities class action cases. In this 
set of regressions, we replace the Total Abnormal Reversal measure with the 
variable Backdating Revelation Abnormal Return. Backdating Revelation 
Abnormal Return is the cumulative abnormal return of each firm’s stock 
computed over the ten trading days prior to the first revelation that the firm 
may have engaged in backdating and one day post-revelation.140 We were able 
 
139 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
140 To identify this revelation date, we searched Lexis for the firm name and variations on the 
term “backdating.” We identified the first article indicating any of the following: possible backdating 
issues at the firm; that the firm is delaying financial reports; or that the firm is launching an 
investigation related to backdating. If no news articles meet these criteria, or if the first mention in 
the news indicated that the firm was already implicated, we reviewed the firm’s SEC filings for the 
first disclosure related to backdating. We were able to make such an identification for 171 of the 
firms in our sample, but we could not determine the dates on which the remaining firms were 
implicated in the scandal. We used an eleven-day window to capture the possibility that some news 
of backdating reached the market prior to the earliest article we were able to identify.  
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to identify the relevant date for 171 of the firms in our implicated sample. The 
stock return is a better measure of potential liability in a securities fraud case 
based on backdating than is the Total Abnormal Reversal, because the 
measure of damages in securities fraud cases is the inflation in the firm’s stock 
price attributable to the fraudulent misrepresentation.141 Thus, the total value 
extracted from the firms due to backdating matters, which the Total 
Abnormal Return is closely related, is relevant to damages in a securities case 
only insofar as it affects the stock market’s response. The regressions in Table 
4.B show that both the probability of having backdated and the price response 
to the revelation of potential backdating are strongly correlated with the 
likelihood of the firm being targeted by a lawsuit. Consistent with the 
derivative suit findings in Table 4.A this relationship is robust to controlling 
for the presence of an SEC investigation.  
 
 
141 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (holding that 
damages should be measured by the difference between the fair value of what the seller received and 
what he would have obtained absent the fraudulent conduct). 
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Table 4A: Incidence of Derivative Lawsuits Logit Regressions142 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Backdating 
Prob. 
2.177*** 
(3.81) 
1.636*** 
   (2.77) 
 
  
Log (Total Abnormal 
Reversal) 
0.082*** 
   (4.70) 
0.065*** 
  (3.96) 
  
SEC Investigation 
Indicator 
1.661*** 
   (5.20) 
1.572*** 
  (4.81) 
  
Log Market Cap 0.462*** 0.356** 0.295* 0.218 
  (3.01)  (2.27)   (1.86)     (1.41) 
  
Constant -4.808*** -4.186*** -1.600 -1.631 
 (-3.51) (-3.02) (-1.29) (-1.34) 
Observations 255 252 255 255 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.199 0.109 0.188 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
 
142 These logit regressions take the incidence of at least one backdating suit against a firm as 
the dependent variable. The sample is the set of firms that were implicated in backdating activity 
by at least one public list of likely backdaters. Z statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4B: Incidence of Securities Class Action Lawsuits  
Logit Regressions143 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Backdating Prob. 5.058** 
   (2.25) 
4.227** 
   (2.07) 
 
  
Backdating Revelation 
Abnormal Return 
-6.426***
 (-2.90) 
-6.943*** 
  (-2.75) 
  
SEC Investigation 
Indicator 
1.396*** 
  (3.29) 
1.907*** 
   (3.26) 
 
Log Market Cap 0.149 -0.022 0.229 0.0153 
   (0.90) (-0.12)   (1.00)   (0.06) 
 
Constant -7.442*** -6.189*** -3.752** -3.459 
 (-3.00) (-2.70)  (-1.97)   (-1.54) 
Observations 255 255 171 171 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.143 0.063 0.149 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In summary, the results in Tables 4.A and 4.B suggest that private 
litigation did not follow automatically from the public revelation that a firm 
may have backdated. Instead, we find that suits against public companies are 
related to the egregiousness of the backdating activity. This correlation does 
not follow mechanically from private litigation chasing SEC investigations, 
as the effect is robust to controlling for SEC activity. The results are 
consistent with litigants screening for more meritorious suits. This does not 
necessarily establish that private suits are socially valuable. A relationship 
between the incidence of litigation and the merits of cases is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for private litigation to have social value. 
 
143 These logit regressions take the incidence of at least one backdating securities class action 
suit against a firm as the dependent variable. The sample is the set of firms that were implicated in 
backdating activity by at least one public list of likely backdaters. Z statistics in parentheses. 
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Nevertheless, these findings cast doubt on the view that private litigation 
followed automatically from public association with backdating.  
Table 5 presents Poisson regressions with the number of distinct lawsuits 
each firm attracted as the dependent variable, conditional on at least one 
lawsuit being filed. In derivative litigation, there are no strong ex ante rules 
governing the appointment of lead counsel, in contrast to the PSLRA’s 
presumption that the plaintiff with the largest holdings is most appropriate 
as lead.144 Thus, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be willing to file a claim in the hope 
that they will win appointment as lead counsel by, say, filing the first 
complaint or the most detailed complaint. In addition, derivative litigation 
can be filed in any court with jurisdiction, and there are no rules governing 
coordination of similar cases in competing jurisdictions. Thus, similar cases 
are often filed in different court systems, and plaintiffs’ attorneys compete 
with each other to see who will win control of the claims.145 For these reasons, 
the same claim can sometimes attract numerous identical lawsuits, which are 
all driven by plaintiffs’ attorneys competing for a share of the ultimate 
settlement. We find only a weak relationship between the measures of 
backdating activity and the number of complaints, but we do find that larger 
firms and firms subject to SEC investigations were associated with more 
complaints. Both firm size and the involvement of the SEC would raise the 
public profile of a claim, which could reasonably be expected to draw more 
complaints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2012) (“[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the 
most adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons that . . . has the largest financial interest 
in the relief sought by the class . . . .”).  
145 See Myers, supra note 99, at 469 (explaining that shareholders file identical claims in more 
than one forum and compete to settle with the defendants). 
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Table 5: Number of Distinct Claims Poisson Regressions146 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Total 
Claims 
Filed 
Total 
Claims 
Filed 
Total 
Claims 
Filed 
Total 
Claims 
Filed 
  
Firm Backdating 
Prob. 0.311 0.150 
 
 (1.19) (0.59)  
  
log(Total 
Abnormal 
Reversal) 0.00210 -0.000989 
   (0.18)  (-0.09) 
  
SEC 
Investigation 
Indicator 0.372***  0.386*** 
   (3.58)   (3.59) 
  
Log Market Cap 0.215*** 0.189*** 0.206*** 0.187*** 
    (3.27)   (2.91)   (2.94)    (2.77) 
  
Constant -0.589 -0.487 -0.255 -0.352 
    (-1.10) (-0.94) (-0.46) (-0.65) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.050 0.022 0.049 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
146 This table presents Poisson regressions where the dependent variable is the number of 
distinct lawsuits observed targeting each firm that was targeted at least once. Therefore, the sample 
is the 161 firms with at least one backdating claim. This measures the magnitude of the “race to the 
courthouse” with respect to the firm.  
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B. Dismissal 
The motion to dismiss is a critical threshold for private litigation as few 
cases go to trial;147 most cases in our sample that survived the motion to dismiss 
ended in settlement. The requirement that a shareholder make a demand on 
the board before filing constitutes the major obstacle for a derivative 
plaintiff.148 The only circumstance in which the demand requirement is excused 
is when it would be futile to ask the board to enforce the claims, and the 
common basis for futility is that the members of the board are the very people 
who would be targets of the claims.149 Thus, one common basis for a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss is that the plaintiff shareholder failed to make a 
demand on the board and did not offer sufficient allegations that doing so 
would have been futile. A second threat to a derivative plaintiff is the statute 
of limitations for fiduciary claims. The backdating scandal arose in 2006 but 
most backdating took place before 2002, when Sarbanes–Oxley narrowed the 
reporting lag for option grants.150 In Delaware, for example, the limitations 
period is three years for fiduciary claims,151 although courts were willing to 
extend the statute of limitations given the obvious concealment associated with 
backdating.152 Nevertheless, many defendants would have presumably moved 
to dismiss claims alleging the backdating of grants more than three years before 
the filing of the suit.153  
Of the 161 firms that faced a backdating derivative suit, 43 of them (27%) 
had their claims dismissed. Figure 6 compares kernel density plots of the firm 
 
147 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical 
Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 444 (1996) (noting that only 3.6% of cases in federal courts 
are resolved through trial).  
148 See Koopmann, supra note 117, at 902 (“[O]nce a plaintiff files a claim, the court will hear 
motions and arguments centered on the plaintiff’s claim of futility.”). 
149 See id. (noting that doubt as to the independence of the board is one reason why a court 
will excuse demand). Another reason that a court may excuse demand is if sufficient facts are pled 
to show that the board lacked valid business judgment in carrying out the transaction at issue. Id. 
But in reality, rebutting the presumption of valid business judgment is very difficult. See Lori 
McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.J. 521, 529 
(2013) (“Realistically, it is difficult for a plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule, given that 
prior to discovery, the information needed might not be readily available.”). 
150 After Sarbanes–Oxley, the reporting period was shortened to two days. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2012). 
151 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106(a) (2014) (“[N]o action based on . . . fiduciary 
relations . . . shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such 
action . . . .”). 
152 See, e.g., Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 360 (Del. Ch. 2007) (tolling the three-year statute of 
limitations on fiduciary claims in a backdating case and holding that “where plaintiff alleges that 
defendants intentionally falsified public disclosures, defendants may not rely on the statute of 
limitations as a defense until plaintiff is placed on inquiry notice that such filings were fraudulent”).  
153 E.g., Motion to Dismiss or Stay at 30, Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (No. 
2213-N) (arguing that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations).  
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level reversal p-value for the dismissed and non-dismissed claims. The claims 
that survived dismissal appear to have slightly lower p-values and therefore 
higher probabilities of backdating, but a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test154 is 
unable to confirm that the non-dismissed cases have higher backdating 
probability at conventional levels of statistical significance.  
 
Figure 7: Comparative Density for Derivative Suit Motion to Dismiss 
 
 
 
As might be expected in light of the simple, two-sample comparisons, our 
regression results show little relationship between the merits of the case and 
surviving the motion to dismiss. Tables 6 and 7 present regressions of 
dismissals on variables related to backdating activity155 and other covariates. 
We use covariates similar to the targeting regressions. We find no significant 
or nearly-significant results in either regression, and all of the models are 
quite weak as measured by pseudo R-squared. Given that the most common 
basis for dismissal, failure to make demand on the board, is not related to the 
merits, at least directly, the fate of the motion to dismiss may turn on legal 
details these regressions do not capture. Thus, the weak relationship of 
dismissal to the merits of cases is not necessarily a surprise. On the other 
 
154 The Kolgomorov–Smirnov test is a nonparametric test of the equality of continuous 
distributions. See generally W.J. CONNOVER, PRACTICAL NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 428-42 
(3d ed. 1999). 
155 Backdating Revelation Abnormal Return, which we use in Table 4.B, also shows no strong 
relationship to the motion to dismiss, but, since we can identify the relevant news dates for only a 
subsample, and the sample is already small, we report the results for Total Abnormal Reversal.  
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hand, it is perhaps desirable that the motion to dismiss avoid screening out 
meritorious cases, which would introduce considerable noise into the 
deterrence function of litigation. While our measure of merit is subject to 
some degree of measurement error, based on these results, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the motion to dismiss is inefficiently screening 
meritorious cases both in the derivative and class action contexts. 
 
Table 6: Derivative Suit Dismissal Logit Regression156 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Backdating Prob. -0.633 -0.685  
 (-0.71) (-0.78)  
 
Log(Total Abnormal Reversal) -0.0269
(-0.74) 
-0.0288 
(-0.82) 
 
SEC Investigation Indicator 0.332
 (0.78) 
0.332 
 (0.79) 
 
Log Market Cap 0.101 0.0909 0.142 0.133 
 (0.43) (0.38) (0.61) (0.56) 
 
Constant -1.281 -1.345 -2.117 -2.229 
 (-0.61) (-0.64) (-1.13) (-1.18) 
Observations 122 122 122 122 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.010 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
156 These regressions take the dismissal of the suit as a dependent variable. The sample 
includes firms targeted by shareholder derivative suits. We exclude from the sample cases in which 
the corporation used a special litigation committee, since dismissal in those cases presents a different 
set of merits-related considerations.  
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Table 7: Securities Suit Dismissal Logit Regression157 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Backdating Prob. -0.657 -1.973  
 (-0.28) (-0.58)  
 
Log(Total Abnormal Reversal) 0.022
  (0.71) 
-0.003 
  (-0.06) 
 
SEC Investigation Indicator 1.322
 (0.70) 
1.026 
  (0.64) 
 
Log Market Cap -0.419 -0.700 -0.428 -0.620 
 (-0.66) (-0.92)  (-0.68) (-0.86) 
 
Constant 2.552 4.936 1.991 2.712 
 (0.47) (0.73) (0.40) (0.52) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.043 0.014 0.032 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
C. Settlement 
For the reasons discussed above, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude 
of a settlement in a derivative case alleging backdating, and the mere fact of 
settlement tells us little when the size of the settlement cannot be carefully 
measured. We do, however, observe the size of attorneys’ fees awarded in 
cases that have settled. Since attorneys’ fees are likely to be related to the 
magnitude of the settlement, they provide a useful proxy for the size of 
settlements.158 Table 8 takes the logarithm of attorneys’ fees in eighty-four 
 
157 These regressions take the dismissal of the suit as a dependent variable. The sample includes 
all firms targeted by securities class action suits.  
158 In their study of recovery amounts and fee awards in class action and derivative litigation 
between 1993 and 2008, Eisenberg and Miller find that “[t]he associations between fee and recovery 
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cases as the dependent variable regressed on measures of backdating activity 
and other covariates.  
The results of the regressions show a modest relationship between merits 
and attorneys’ fees. There is no strong relationship between Firm-Level 
Backdating Probability and Attorney Fee Awarded, but the log of Total 
Abnormal Reversal is significant at the 10% level. While this is a modest 
result, in light of the small sample, it is nevertheless important insofar as it 
provides direct evidence that payments in derivative suits are correlated to 
the merits of claims. Intuitively, the Total Abnormal Reversal measure 
should correlate closest with settlement amount since it captures the value 
extracted through backdating. We also find very significant size effects in 
these regressions. Firm size is potentially relevant if courts consider the 
benefit to shareholders of, say, corporate governance changes that are 
included in settlements. Larger firms may also have litigated more vigorously 
or required more extensive discovery, creating larger legal bills for plaintiffs 
in the process. 
Table 9 repeats these measures for securities class actions. We use the log 
of the size of the settlement in each case. Since the settlement amounts are 
available for the securities class actions, there is no need to proxy them using 
attorneys’ fees. While the presence of an SEC investigation and firm size are 
both significant, neither of the merits measures is significant. Backdating 
Revelation Abnormal Return is not available for the full sample, and the 
subsample for which it is measurable is too small for meaningful regression 
analysis.159  
 
 
are striking and large. The linear correlation between fee and recovery exceeds 0.94 for each time 
period and the slope of the relationship appears constant for the two time periods.” Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 253 (2010).  
159 In unreported test, we find no significant relationship between Backdating Revelation 
Abnormal Return and the settlement size. Since this is a relationship we expect to be significant ex 
ante, we attribute this to having only twenty-two observations and that some securities lawsuits 
involved allegations unrelated to backdating.  
  
2016] Do the Merits Matter? 339 
 
Table 8: Size of Derivative Settlement Attorney Fee Award160 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Backdating Prob. 0.604 0.440  
 (1.32) (0.91)  
 
Log (Total Abnormal Reversal) 0.0303* 0.0269* 
 (1.97) (1.72) 
 
SEC Investigation Indicator 0.299 0.274 
 (1.44) (1.30) 
 
Log Market Cap 0.356*** 0.326*** 0.338*** 0.314*** 
 (3.50) (3.21) (3.36) (3.06) 
 
Constant 11.08*** 11.28*** 11.74*** 11.77*** 
 (13.22) (13.73) (14.96) (14.59) 
Observations 84 84 84 84 
R2 0.111 0.133 0.144 0.163 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 These regressions take the log of total attorneys’ fees awarded to all plaintiffs in a particular 
case as the dependent variable. The sample consists of all sued firms in which attorneys’ fees were 
awarded.  
  
340 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 291 
 
Table 9: Log Securities Settlement Size Regressions161 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Backdating Prob. 1.224 -0.216
 (1.59) (-0.22)
 
Log (Total Lucky Reversal) 0.0351 0.0111
 (0.99) (0.33)
 
SEC Investigation Indicator 1.223* 1.059*
 (1.88) (1.72)
 
Log Market Cap 1.216*** 0.890* 1.213*** 0.930*
 (3.58) (1.93) (3.40) (2.06)
 
Constant 6.195** 9.209** 7.360** 8.806**
 (2.22) (2.44) (2.64) (2.63)
Observations 27 27 27 27
R2 0.311 0.388 0.335 0.390
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
161 These regressions take the log of settlement payment in securities class action suits as the 
dependent variable. The sample is all firms sued in securities class actions that ended in settlement 
and for which the settlement value is available.  
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D. Special Litigation Committees 
It is possible to dismiss derivative suits using special litigation committees 
(SLCs). These committees are comprised of independent directors not 
involved in the suit who are charged with evaluating whether the suit should 
proceed.162 SLCs were used with some regularity in backdating cases: 24% of 
sued firms established an SLC. The conventional wisdom on SLCs is that they 
nearly always recommend dismissal,163 but recent empirical work has cast doubt 
on this widely-held view.164  
We focus on the question of which firms elected to use an SLC. If 
companies wanted to use SLCs as a mechanism for sweeping strong claims 
under the rug, we would expect that companies facing the strongest claims of 
backdating would establish SLCs, and the SLCs would recommend dismissal. 
The regressions in Table 10 test whether SLCs are associated with stronger 
cases. We also include the merits-related variable High Backdating 
Probability Indicator, which takes the value 1 when the firm has a backdating 
probability of 0.99 or higher, and value 0 otherwise. We use this independent 
variable because an SLC may be particularly attractive when a firm is faced 
with a complaint that is very likely to succeed. We also include the number 
of individual complaints filed as an independent variable. A company facing 
numerous suits, possibly in multiple jurisdictions, might conclude that the 
costs and risk associated with establishing an SLC are worth attempting to 
wrest control of the case from competing sets of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In this 
way, the number of cases against a company might be a proxy for the 
complexity of litigation and the challenge of consolidating and resolving 
numerous claims. The regression results indicate that firms with very high 
backdating probability and many complaints were more likely to use SLCs to 
resolve their claims, consistent with these hypotheses. But there is 
insufficient statistical power in our sample here to draw conclusions about 
whether the SLCs that sought dismissal were faced with less meritorious 
 
162 See Koopmann, supra note 117, at 908 n.114 (“In demand futility cases, a board may form a 
special litigation committee to determine whether the litigation should continue after the court has 
excused demand.”). 
163 See Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical 
Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1314 (2009) (commenting that academics and practitioners “are 
nearly unanimous in the belief that SLCs always decide to dismiss derivative litigation”).  
164 See id. at 1320 (“Over forty percent of the time the SLC either settled or pursued one or 
more claims against one or more defendants.”). 
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cases than those that suggested that the litigation proceed.  Notably, a 
majority of SLCs recommended that the litigation not be dismissed in full.   
 
Table 10: Use of Special Litigation Committee Logit Regressions165 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Firm Backdating 
Prob. 
2.123 
 (1.58) 
0.725 
 (0.57) 
0.649 
(0.55) 
   
       
Log (Total 
Lucky Reversal) 
   -0.024 
 (-0.87) 
-0.052* 
(-1.76) 
-0.056* 
(-1.79) 
       
High Backdating 
Prob. Indicator 
 0.984** 
(2.13) 
0.915* 
(1.92) 
 1.34*** 
(3.21) 
1.27*** 
 (2.90) 
       
Total Claims 
Filed 
  0.236***   0.240*** 
   (3.11)   (3.16) 
       
Log Market Cap 0.215 0.251 0.0216 0.203 0.304 0.105 
 (0.94) (1.08) (0.09) (0.94) (1.29) (0.41) 
       
Constant -4.725** -4.191* -3.313 -2.772 -4.123** -3.569* 
 (-2.12) (-1.95) (-1.49) (-1.59) (-2.10) (-1.67) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 161 161 
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.055 0.125 0.008 0.070 0.140 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW 
Our results provide rarely-available insight into the relationship between 
the merits of cases and the incidence and outcomes of those cases. For this 
 
165 These logit regressions take as a dependent variable an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm formed an SLC in order to address a shareholder derivative suit. The sample is 
all firms that were sued derivatively for options backdating.  
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reason, our findings have important implications for corporate law and raise 
a number of other questions for research. In this Part, we discuss these 
implications and the limitations of our findings on the filing, dismissal, and 
settlement of stockholder claims as well as on the use of special litigation 
committees, with an eye toward questions that may guide future research.  
 A. Filing of Derivative Claims 
We show that the filing of derivative suits alleging backdating was 
strongly related to measures of both the Firm-Level Backdating Probability 
and the magnitude of the stock price reversal. Derivative suits against firms 
were not a mechanical function of those firms being named in the news or 
being the target of an SEC inquiry. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, in other words, 
focused their energies on companies where private enforcement would make 
the most sense from a social standpoint. Uncovering this basic empirical 
relationship between the incidence of suits and their merit demonstrates a 
crucial link in the American system of corporate and securities law, and for 
this reason our findings indicate that there is hope yet for that system.  
Interestingly, we find that a substantial number of firms that likely 
backdated were never subject to a derivative suit for backdating, despite the 
fact that they were publicly named. Our results suggest, of course, that these 
were less egregious cases of backdating, but it seems likely, given the size of 
attorneys’ fee awards in the cases actually brought, that such cases might have 
been profitable for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring. This finding raises the 
possibility that the procedural pendulum may already have swung too far in the 
direction of keeping derivative claims out of court. After all, if clear and 
demonstrable legal malfeasance cannot be viably prosecuted by the plaintiffs’ 
bar, then to what degree does murkier wrongdoing go unpunished?  
At the same time, we cannot draw too strong of a conclusion from our 
backdating litigation data about derivative litigation more generally. 
Backdating litigation differs in important ways from other types of derivative 
litigation. In backdating cases, for example, the legal issues were fewer for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys because the basic wrong was a straightforward violation 
of the directors’ fiduciary duties and generated at least some level of liability. 
Perhaps liability in other contexts might present more risk to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, leading them to focus less on the underlying wrongdoing. Another 
unique feature of backdating is that the behavior can be uncovered through 
statistical techniques. These techniques allowed finance scholars to detect the 
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pattern, allowed the news media to write about it, and of course, allowed us 
to conduct our empirical analysis. It may also have allowed plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to perform similar investigations into merit before filing, and thus 
their filing decisions in the backdating cases may differ systematically from 
their filing decisions in more standard corporate contexts, where the merits 
cannot be observed in advance.  
But which way does this difference cut? If the plaintiffs’ bar does a good 
job of selecting claims when information is available, then a colorable 
argument could be made that the solution to low-quality cases is not to raise 
hurdles that cut across both meritorious suits and strike suits. Rather, the 
solution would be to find ways to expand the base of information that can be 
used to identify promising claims at the outset, to expand the set of cases that 
function like backdating cases rather than tamp down litigation altogether. 
Suggestions in this direction might include expanded access to books and 
records and perhaps enhanced, if still limited, discovery when pleading 
demand excusal.  
While caution is necessary in generalizing our findings, we nevertheless 
show that the filing decisions of plaintiffs’ attorneys were responsive to various 
measures of merit. In the context of the debate over fee-shifting bylaws, for 
example, that finding carries important weight. By forcing shareholders to bear 
the costs of defending unsuccessful suits, fee-shifting bylaws would discourage 
derivative suits, perhaps to the point of eliminating them. Fee-shifting bylaws 
create extreme risks, not just for the plaintiffs’ bar, but also for shareholder 
plaintiffs who would face fee-shifting risk on their own while being forced to 
share recovery with other plaintiffs. If fee-shifting indeed would have the effect 
that many critics suspect it would, it would inhibit the operation of a system 
that appeared to work well at identifying firms to target for private 
enforcement in the backdating context.  
 B. Dismissal and Settlement of Claims 
While our findings on the incidence of suit are reassuring, our findings 
on dismissal and settlement are far more equivocal. On dismissal, we 
uncovered no significant difference in our backdating-related variables 
between companies for which derivative claims were dismissed, and 
companies for which they were not. This finding suggests that the motion to 
dismiss is not functioning as an effective merits-based screening mechanism. 
That may not be problematic, however. Many common grounds for motions 
to dismiss are quintessentially procedural: failure to make demand on the 
board, the running of the statute of limitations, and so forth. Perhaps it could 
make sense to apply some merits-based screen at some point in the litigation 
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prior to summary judgment, but in derivative litigation, there is no such 
screen beyond the basic civil pleading standards. For that reason, we would 
not expect any relationship to exist between the success of these procedure-
based motions and the merits of claims. Indeed, it might suggest something 
amiss if procedural motions appear to be strongly correlated with merit.  
On the other hand, if procedural hurdles are creating obstacles to bringing 
cases that allege real, demonstrable harms to shareholders, then they come at 
a cost in terms of deterrence. Does the demand on the board requirement, for 
example, provide clear benefits that offset the cost it imposes by screening 
out meritorious claims? Our results help give a sense of what is lost through 
these procedural mechanisms: meritorious claims are just as likely to fail as 
frivolous claims, at least in the backdating context, and that alone ought to 
give pause to the architects and observers of our system of corporate liability.  
The settlement findings indicate some modest relationship between case 
outcomes and merit, but again caution is in order. Because we cannot reliably 
measure the settlement values, we are relying on attorneys’ fees as a proxy 
for settlement values. The relationship we find is a weak one. One possibility 
is that the relationship between settlement values and the merits is strong, 
but we can only pick that up roughly through attorneys’ fees. Another 
possibility is that our proxy is unreliable; it may be only the attorneys’ fees 
that correlate with merit, and the settlement value bears little or no 
relationship to the strength of the claim. For these reasons, the policy 
implications of our findings are not nearly as suggestive as our findings on 
the incidence of suits. It is nevertheless encouraging from a policy and 
deterrence standpoint that some relationship is observable. Certainly it 
would be a source of concern if the relationship ran in the opposite direction.  
C. Special Litigation Committees 
Our findings on special litigation committees suggest that the behavior of 
directors called to serve in that role is far less abusive than many have 
supposed.166 Contrary to the hypothesis that SLCs might be used to sweep 
egregious backdating under the rug, most of the SLCs in our sample 
recommended that at least some of the claims in the litigation proceed or 
settle, with only nine of thirty-eight SLCs recommending dismissal and only 
 
166 See Myers, supra note 163, at 1320 (finding that SLCs dismiss cases far less often than 
popular belief would hold).  
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one SLC successfully securing dismissal of the claim. This is broadly 
inconsistent with the common claim that SLCs usually dismiss derivative 
litigation, but consonant with more recent findings.167 Given that SLC usage 
was associated with more numerous claims, our findings indicate that the 
SLC may be functioning as a form of alternative dispute resolution in the 
derivative context.168  
Our findings also suggest that the legal standards developed to police SLC 
decisions in derivative cases may be well calibrated. In Delaware, courts apply 
a two-step test when reviewing the decisions of an SLC: first, the court 
determines whether the committee is disinterested and followed a reasonable 
investigative procedure, and second, the court can review the business 
judgment of the board in determining how to proceed.169 Some have suggested 
that the forces pushing board members on SLCs to favor their imperiled 
colleagues are so strong that the SLC may be hopelessly biased.170 These 
backdating cases are ones where the defendants would presumably wish to have 
them disappear, but the SLC members declined to do so. The SLC members, 
of course, may have been responding to reputational concerns instead of a 
worry that a court would second guess their decision. But our findings suggest 
that SLC members are able, at least in the backdating context, to press forward 
with meritorious claims, putting SLCs in a positive light.  
CONCLUSION 
On balance, our results suggest that plaintiffs’ attorneys exhibited a 
notable degree of merits-related selectivity in determining which backdating 
cases to pursue. Even controlling for SEC involvement, we find that firms 
with more egregious backdating practices were more likely to be sued. We 
find some evidence that merits continued to matter for derivative claims as 
cases progressed. While motions to dismiss were unrelated to merits factors, 
settlements in derivative cases, as proxied by attorneys’ fees, were larger for 
 
167 See id. at 1327 (reporting that SLCs decide to settle claims 70% of the time).  
168 See id. at 1331-32 (reporting that claims involving SLCs were resolved faster than other 
claims and suggesting that “[a] company may appoint an SLC because doing so resolves claims faster 
and cheaper than the standard course of civil derivative litigation”). 
169 See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (requiring a two-step test to 
examine the legitimacy of an SLC’s decisions). 
170 See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942-43 (Del. Ch. 2003) (drawing 
upon “human nature” to conclude that it would be difficult for SLC members to be unbiased in the 
face of extensive ties to the defendant board and the local community); Claire Hill & Brett 
McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 929-30 (2011) (noting that 
“voluminous social science literature” demonstrates that there are many conscious and unconscious 
factors that might bias those on an SLC). 
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more meritorious cases, albeit with modest statistical significance. Securities 
class actions appeared to target particularly egregious cases, but the 
settlements for class actions were not related to the amount of backdating 
activity. Finally, we contribute to the literature on special litigation 
committees by demonstrating that SLCs in the backdating context seldom 
recommended dismissal.  
While the unique setting of our empirical findings cautions against easy 
generalization, our measures of merit suggest that derivative litigation 
showed signs of functioning well in the backdating context. Moreover, 
derivative litigation was the preferred remedy for shareholders faced with 
backdating managers. As such, it seems prudent that proposed reforms to 
derivative litigation, including fee-shifting bylaws, be approached with 
caution so as not to undermine the pursuit of meritorious claims. 
